Animals, Machines, and Moral Responsibility in a Built Environment by Stapleton, Logan
Macalester College
DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Philosophy Honors Projects Philosophy Department
Spring 5-2-2018
Animals, Machines, and Moral Responsibility in a
Built Environment
Logan Stapleton
Macalester College, lstaple99@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil_honors
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stapleton, Logan, "Animals, Machines, and Moral Responsibility in a Built Environment" (2018). Philosophy Honors Projects. 12.
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil_honors/12
  
 
 
Animals, Machines, and Moral Responsibility in a Built Environment 
Logan Stapleton 
Macalester College Philosophy 
Advisor: Diane Michelfelder 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Nature has ended. Acid rain and global warming leave no place untouched by human hands. We can 
no longer think of 'the environment' as synonymous with 'nature'. Instead, Steven Vogel argues that the 
environment is more like a mall: it is built. And because we build the environment, we are responsible for it. Yet, 
other things build, too. Animals build and use tools. Machines and algorithms build everything from skyscrapers 
to cell phones. Are they responsible for what they build? While animals and robots are normally considered in 
distinct philosophical fields, Vogel’s rejection of the natural-artificial split prompts us to question the distinction 
between natural and artificial agents. I argue, under consistent reasons, that neither animals nor robots are 
morally responsible for what they do. When machines act in morally consequential ways, then, we cannot blame 
the robot. However, we usually think to blame those who built the robot. I present a theory of how a builder may 
be responsible for what they build. Then, I argue that there are cases where neither the robot nor the engineer can 
be blamed for the robot's actions. Drawing on Vogel, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger, I explore moral and 
environmental responsibility through meditations on animals and machines. 
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Chapter One: Building like a Mall 
Nature has ended. Nothing today is untouched by human hands. Global warming and acid rain 
blanket the earth’s surface. Nuclear waste and fossil fuel extraction alter the earth down to its geophysical 
foundations. After Bill McKibben’s (1989) monumental work The End of Nature, environmental 
philosophy is unable to look to ‘nature’ as a guide. Furthermore, most environmental scientists and 
philosophers working today foresee a rapid, catastrophic change in the environment as we know it. 
McKibben writes that “our reassuring sense of a timeless future, which is drawn from that apparently 
bottomless well of the past, is a delusion” (1989, p.2). There is an urgent need to adopt a new 
environmental philosophy that can consistently and powerfully grapple with the environment after the end 
of nature. 
In Thinking Like a Mall, Steven Vogel reinterprets the ‘environment’ as ‘that which environs us’. 
This shifts ‘the environment’, which is usually tied at the hip with ‘nature,’ to an environment which is 
built through human practices. Consequently, environmental ethics cannot rely on ‘nature’ as a moral 
standard. Instead, Vogel argues that humans are responsible for the environment because we built it. In a 
few minor passages, however, Vogel acknowledges that the environment is built through the practices of 
other organisms and through physical processes. To prevent anthropocentrism, he claims that we build the 
environment just as any other thing does. In this paper, I argue that this contradicts his central thesis of 
environmental responsibility. In short, if building implies responsibility and everything builds the 
environment, then everything must be just as responsible for the environment as humans are. In order to 
get out of this contradiction, I argue, Vogel’s postnaturalist environmental philosophy needs to make a 
stronger division between the ways that humans and others build. 
I will begin with Vogel’s notion of thinking like a mall and how it relates to environmental 
responsibility. Then, I will discuss how everything builds the environment and illuminate a contradiction 
in his work. To remedy this contradiction, building must be considered as ontologically different between 
humans and others. To this end, I will discuss some of Vogel’s understanding of building and suggest two 
possible clarifications of his philosophy that avoid this contradiction: 1) from Heidegger on building and 
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thinking, and 2) from Marx on production and species-being. These two proposals salvage some essential 
difference between humans and others, while rejecting the ontological distinction between nature and 
artifact. Each is compatible with Vogel’s central thesis of anthropocentric environmental responsibility in 
the built environment.1 Furthermore, Marx’s solution has important implications on Vogel’s 
understanding of environmental responsibility and politics. I will conclude by discussing some political 
implications of my solution and how they relate to the Anthropocene. 
 
Section One: Thinking Like a Mall 
‘Thinking like a mall’ pays homage to a passage in A Sand County Almanac where Aldo Leopold 
is hunting on a mountain and shoots a mother wolf in front of her cubs (Leopold 1949). His troupe 
approaches the injured wolf only “‘to watch a fierce green fire dying in her eyes” (Vogel 2015, p.129). 
Leopold “saw in that fire something ‘known only to her and to the mountain’” (p.129). For Leopold, 
‘thinking like a mountain’ is to think beyond our limited understanding as humans in order to recognize 
some deep, mystical knowledge held in ‘natural’ things. Conversely, Vogel asks: if we can think like a 
mountain, why can we not think like a mall? ‘Thinking like a mall’ challenges the “dark complexity and 
depth of the processes of nature” (p.129). It considers the mall, an artifact that is not living, as a subject of 
environmental philosophy. It takes environmental as political. It makes no ontological distinction between 
the natural and the artificial. 
To think like a mall is to consider how the environment is more like a mall than a mountain: we 
build the environment. And because we built it, Vogel writes, 
[w]e are responsible for the environment: this [is] the central conclusion of… postnaturalism in 
environmental philosophy. The environment itself is an artifact that we make through our practices, 
                                                 
1 There are many other ways to define a moral agent in such a way that precludes animals. Aristotle 
suggests that animals are not rational nor do they have language, which are necessary for moral agency. 
Frankfurt (1971) suggests that animals do not have second-order volition. Many of these derive from the 
analytic tradition. Here, I give definitions of personhood and moral agency from Heidegger and Marx (1) 
to approach this topic in the Continental tradition and (2) to give an in-depth reading of Vogel’s work. 
Vogel relies heavily on both Heidegger and Marx. As well, others have written on connections between 
Vogel and Heidegger (see Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj’s forthcoming work, “Revisiting an Ecophilosophical 
Reading of Heidegger”). 
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and hence one for which we are responsible and about which we ought to care. If the artifacts that 
surround us are ugly, if they work poorly, if they generate poisons and other toxic waste, if they 
make life worse for us and for the other creatures that inhabit the world with us… this is (in part) 
our doing, and our fault. And so it is also our responsibility to fix (Vogel 2015, p.164-165, 
emphasis in original).  
 The above section illustrates Vogel’s central thesis of his work: building implies responsibility. 
When we make artifacts ugly or they harm other creatures, we are responsible for making them better. 
The environment is an artifact. Humans have made it ugly and it harms other creatures. Thus, we ought to 
make it better. 
However, this isn’t exactly what Vogel says. In fact, he says that the state of the environment is 
our doing, but only in part. There are many other things that build the environment. Vogel writes that “the 
environment comes to be what it is through our practices, just as it comes to be what it is through the 
actions of beavers, honeybees, earthworms, trees, and all other organisms that make up the worlds,” as 
well as non-organisms like “water and soil,... subways, airplanes, and incinerators” (2015, p.66, emphasis 
in original). He makes a few short claims like this throughout his work --saying that we cannot make any 
meaningful distinction between how humans build the environment and how everything else builds. This 
is a secondary claim, but it stands out. Vogel holds that humans are no different from any other organism 
or thing when it comes to building the environment. But, if humans and other organisms all build the 
environment, then why is it that every other organism or thing is not just as responsible as humans are? 
 
Section Two: Contradiction 
To say that everything builds undermines Vogel’s central thesis of human responsibility. Vogel’s 
entire argument rests on his ontology of building. To say that the environment comes to be what it is 
through practices of beavers, water, or subways is to say that all other beings build the environment as 
humans do. Thus, if we accept his central thesis --that building implies responsibility,-- it must follow that 
all these others organisms and things are also responsible for the environment. But, it seems absurd to say 
that beavers or water are responsible for global warming in the same way that humans are. There are so 
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many other things that build the environment that it would be impossible to pinpoint what humans are 
uniquely responsible for and what everything else is responsible for. His central thesis becomes muddled 
if we allow that everything builds the environment with equal responsibility. 
To make this contradiction and its implications clear, we need to distinguish between moral and 
causal responsibility. Causal responsibility is simply assigned to the effect that made brings a cause into 
existence. For example, suppose a domino falls on its own and hits another domino, which hits another 
and another down a long string of dominoes. When the last domino falls, this event was brought into 
existence by every domino in the string; though, it was brought into existence primarily by the first 
domino. Thus, the first domino is causally responsible for the fall of the last domino; though every other 
domino along the way is also causally responsible as well, to a lesser degree. 
Now suppose that, when the last domino falls, it hits a baby and wakes it up. The baby starts 
crying. When the parent comes into the room, they can see that the first domino fell on its own and is 
responsible for waking the baby, but they do not scold the domino. The domino is not morally responsible 
for the events that it causes; only causally responsible. Alternatively, if the baby’s older brother had 
pushed the first domino over, then the older brother would be not only causally, but morally responsible 
for his actions.  
 The contradiction that I laid out above applies to moral responsibility. When Vogel says that 
“[w]e [humans] are responsible for the environment,” he means that we are morally responsible for it: this 
is the central conclusion of postnaturalist environmental philosophy (2015, p.164). Thus, I argue that 
Vogel’s central thesis becomes muddled if we allow that non-humans things are also morally responsible 
for the environment. To clear Vogel’s contradiction, we must claim that when the environment comes to 
be what it is through the practices of non-human things, like rivers, subways, or bees, those things are 
only causally responsible for the environment they build. They are not morally responsible.  
This is a common viewpoint; not one that Vogel would want to disagree with. However, saying 
that only humans are morally responsible for their actions necessitates an ontological distinction between 
humans and natural organisms. Vogel argues against ontological distinctions between things that are built 
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by humans and things that are not, i.e. artificial and natural. When he writes that “the environment comes 
to be what it is through our practices, just as it comes to be what it is through the actions of [others],” it is 
not entirely clear whether he makes an ontological distinction or not. In some sense, one could read the 
phrase “just as it comes to be what it is” as simply recognizing that other things also build the 
environment; yet, they build in fundamentally different ways so as to make only humans responsible for 
their actions (Vogel 2015, p.66, emphasis mine).  
However, it is also plausible that Vogel wants to reject any ontological distinction between 
humans and natural organisms grounded in building. In other passages, Vogel writes that claiming that 
humans are responsible for the environment sounds a lot like claiming that we are “masters of the world” 
(2015, p.164). In order to prevent this “sort of hubris,” Vogel emphasizes humility as an environmental 
virtue (p.164). Similarly, Vogel attempts to rid of any anthropocentric hubris that comes with making 
ontological distinctions between humans and natural things. Thus, the “just as” in the passage “just as it 
comes to be what it is” can also reasonably be read as a rejection of the ontological distinction between 
humans and natural organisms, like animals, based on how we build the environment (p.66, emphasis 
mine). In this case, there are no grounds that allow Vogel to assign moral responsibility to humans and 
not natural organisms. 
In other passages, he makes clear that even if “the environment comes to be what it is through our 
practices, just as it comes to be” through the actions of others, this is not to mean that everything builds 
equally in any shallow sense (2015, p.66, emphasis in original). Beavers do not use backhoes. Subways 
cannot build houses. Honeybees cannot craft atomic bombs.  
Rather, Vogel writes that 
we can distinguish between things that humans make and things they don’t --they make toasters 
and shopping malls, they don’t make rocks or mountains-- and we can even distinguish among 
various ‘degrees’ of human-madeness --there’s much more human work involved in the 
construction of a skyscraper than in the building of a hut in the Black Forest... But none of these 
distinctions has any ontological significance: there are doubtless occasions where it might be useful 
to draw them so as to indicate the relative role played by different organisms in an item’s genesis, 
in the same way, for example, that one might want to distinguish soil that has been well fertilized 
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and aerated by earthworms from soil that has not, but there is nothing ontologically fundamental 
implied by these distinctions (Vogel 2015, p.169, emphasis in original). 
Here Vogel says that, given an object, we can distinguish between how much humans make it and 
how much other organisms make it. In this passage, he is not explicitly writing about moral responsibility. 
However, he does say that “there are doubtless occasions where it might be useful to draw [distinctions] 
so as to indicate the relative role played by different organisms in an item’s genesis” (p.169). One may 
read this and respond that assigning anthropocentric moral responsibility for the environment is an 
occasion where it might be useful to draw a distinction so as to indicate the relative responsibility played 
by different organisms. In this way, we can determine how responsible each organism is for making an 
object. A worm is causally responsible for aerating a pile of soil, but a human is not. For the case of the 
environment, if we can determine how much humans make it and how much other things make it, we can 
determine how much each thing is responsible for the environment. However, this distinction is not 
ontologically significant. Thus, it seems that we can read Vogel’s philosophy as ridding of an ontological 
distinction between humans and nature, while allowing for a moral distinction to be drawn. It seems that 
Vogel’s philosophy does not run into the contradiction outlined above. 
However, this reading is flawed in two ways: 1) assigning moral responsibility only to humans 
requires some ontological significance between the distinction between how humans and non-humans 
organisms build; and 2) he falsely reduces the task of assigning responsibility for the environment to the 
simplistic task of assigning responsibility for a single object. 
First, even if we can assign relative responsibility for building different things, this still does not 
reveal on what grounds Vogel makes the claim that only humans are morally responsible. We can tell that 
worms aerate a handful of soil. They are causally responsible for it. Yet, if that soil is built badly, the 
worm is not morally responsible for improving it. We can also tell that humans build a mall. They are 
causally responsible for it. However, if that mall is built badly, the people are morally responsible for 
improving it. This is the distinction that Vogel makes. It is a moral distinction that is grounded in an 
ontological distinction between humans and others.  
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Yet, he argues that there is no ontological significance to distinctions between things that are 
human-made and things that are not. Ontological significance refers to something like the deep, mystical 
knowledge in Leopold’s mountain. It is something special about ‘nature’ that exists independently of 
humans. For example, many environmental thinkers treat ecologically restored habitats as second-class to 
‘natural’ habitats that are otherwise identical but were not regrown by humans.2 They are lesser because 
they do not have the property of being ‘natural’. This is simply a point about the things that are built. It is 
not a point about the builders themselves. 
Vogel’s philosophy needs to make an explicit some ontological distinction between humans and 
others so as to assign moral responsibility solely to humans, in order to avoid the contradiction outlined 
above. He rejects the ontological significance of distinctions between natural and artificial things. Thus, 
he must make an ontological distinction grounded in how builders --humans and other organisms-- are 
different. This requires an explanation of how humans and other organisms build differently. 
Second, it requires greater distinction to assign human responsibility for the environment than it 
does to assign human responsibility for an individual object. We can say that humans build toasters or 
even shopping malls. We can also say that they don’t make rocks or mountains. But these are tangible, 
everyday things. The environment is not tangible and cannot be understood as an individual object like a 
toaster or a mall.  
Timothy Morton would describe the environment as a hyperobject: a thing that is “massively 
distributed in time and space relative to humans” and cannot manifest itself locally (p.1). (2013). For 
example, Morton also describes the Solar System, all of the plutonium on earth, and the Florida 
Everglades as hyperobjects. Because hyperobjects do not manifest themselves locally, they “exhibit their 
effects interobjectively; that is, they can only be detected in a space that consists of interrelationships 
between [individual] objects” (p.1). For example, one can feel heat and radiation from holding a single 
stick of plutonium. However, only in Nagasaki or Chernobyl can we detect the effects of an enormous 
                                                 
2 See Robert Elliot’s “Faking Nature” (1982) or Eric Katz’ “The Big Lie” (1992). 
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collection of plutonium over a long period of time. Furthermore, the effects of the totality of plutonium 
can only be detected through the largest possible generalizations from effects of single sticks or enormous 
collections. The environment is similar in that it can be observed only by first making general claims 
about weather patterns over time (climate), then about how climate changes over time, and finally about 
how local climate changes add up globally. Thus, determining how much we built the environment must 
be determined through large, scientific, statistically-mediated means. We can take millions of local 
temperatures and samples of sea ice over thousands of years, measure all the added carbon emissions 
through cars and agriculture and deforestation, then make a scientific theory to explain the raising 
temperatures and shrinking sea ice via greenhouse gases. This is very different from reading “Made in 
China” on the bottom of a toaster.  
The enormity and vagueness of assigning causal responsibility to the environment requires 
greater demarcation between humans and others than assigning causal responsibility to an individual 
object does. The enormity and vagueness of how the environment is affected by the practices of anything 
requires makes assigning causal responsibility for the environment more difficult than assigning causal 
responsibility for an individual object. Since even causal responsibility is more unclear, a philosophy that 
claims that humans are solely responsible for the environment cannot waver on its distinctions between 
humans and other organisms in assigning moral responsibility. If Vogel allows that animals build 
similarly to humans, then it would seem that these animals are similarly morally responsible for the things 
that they build. On an environmental scale, even the smallest bit of moral responsibility for things is 
exacerbated by orders of magnitudes, due to the sheer amount of things that are built or influenced by 
animals. If Vogel allows for similarity between how humans and others build, this would lead to a 
muddling of moral responsibility on an environmental scale. Thus, he needs to make a clear ontological 
distinction between humans and natural organisms grounded in building. He needs to say exactly why 
humans build in a unique manner in order to claim that only humans are morally responsible for the 
environment. 
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To be clear, Vogel does make distinctions between humans and nature based on language. He 
writes “[n]ature does not… actually use language, because to use language is to converse” and “nature 
does not talk with us, it talks at us” (p.185). Traditionally in environmental philosophy, when nature is 
described as having language, it is never capable of listening; rather  
we respond to it like silent subjects listening to the commands of a monarch, not like participants in a 
dialogue who develop mutual understanding and respect through repeatedly and alternately taking up 
the positions of speaker and listener (p.185). 
Vogel argues that nature is incapable of engaging in conversation and, thus, does not have language. 
Furthermore, since justification can only arise in conversation, nature cannot make justifiable claims: only 
tautologies. Ethical claims are necessarily justifiable and arise in dialogue. Thus, nature does not have an 
ethics. Only humans, who have language, can have ethics. 
At first glance, this seems like a way for Vogel to say that only humans are morally responsible. 
One could argue that, since only humans can engage in conversation that leads to moral assertions, only 
humans can assert who is morally responsible.  
Yet, this is lacking. This would only imply that humans can determine who is blameworthy, not 
that only humans are blameworthy. Someone can be held morally responsible even if they cannot engage 
in conversation. For example, consider two opposing soldiers that do not speak the same language; say, a 
Vietnamese soldier and an American. The American shoots and wounds the Vietnamese soldier. Even if 
they cannot engage in conversation, the Vietnamese soldier still holds the American morally responsible 
for his wound.  
Furthermore, simply having ethics is not sufficient for assigning moral responsibility. For 
example, suppose that the American and the Vietnamese soldiers have contradictory ethics based in their 
respective languages. The Vietnamese soldiers still blames the American for shooting him. Yet, it is not 
because they operate under the same ethics. They both have the capacity for ethics and language. 
However, the use of language or ethics is not sufficient for assigning moral responsibility.  
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Thus, any distinction between man and nature that implies solely human moral responsibility 
must do so through deeper means than surface-level language use, like engaging in conversation. To say 
humans are responsible for the environment because we built it requires demarcating humans from nature 
through building. 
 
Section Three: Heidegger 
Heidegger offers a solution to Vogel’s contradiction by distinguishing building between humans 
and animals through thinking and language. Heidegger grounds the fact that only humans use language in 
a deeper ontological difference between humans and nature. Considering Heidegger’s understanding of 
building in Vogel’s philosophy will allow for a way to clarify how Vogel assigns moral responsibility 
solely to humans. This avoids the contradiction that arises when considering natural organisms as morally 
responsible in Vogel’s philosophy. Furthermore, Heidegger’s solution fits well within Vogel’s philosophy 
because Vogel draws heavily from Heidegger and both of their understandings of language-use are very 
similar. 
Heidegger, like Vogel, also draws a distinction between humans and animals through language 
and dialogue.3 Dialogue is important to both Heidegger and Vogel in how they conceive of language and 
logos, which can be read as synonymous. For Heidegger, “λόγος (logos) as discourse really means δηλοῦν 
(deloun), to make manifest ‘what is being talked about’ in discourse” ([1953] 2010, p.30). Furthermore, 
“λόγος (logos) lets something be seen” in that engaging in dialogue discloses truth. 
Both thinkers follow the classical Aristotelian alterity relation with animality where man is zoon 
logon ekhon and animal is alogon (without logos).4 Rather than interpreting logos as logic, reason, or 
rationality, both thinkers interpret it as speaking and, in particular, dialogue. As well, for Heidegger 
thinking is “like building a cabinet:” “it is a craft, a ‘handicraft’” (Heidegger 1976, p.16). Thus, 
                                                 
3 I consider animals as a paradigmatic case for natural organisms. If we draw an ontological distinction 
between humans and animals, then we can draw one for any natural organism. 
4 For Heidegger, animals are poor in a number of different ways: they are “without language, without 
history, without hands, without dwelling, without space” (Elden, 2006 p.274). 
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Heidegger connects thinking and building like Vogel does (thinking like a mall is a meditation on 
building). However, Heidegger articulates this connection through hands: 
Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element of thinking, 
every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking 
(Heidegger 1976, p.16). 
From the above passage, we see how intimately connected the hand and thinking are. Vogel 
considers building and thinking first, then considers language as a means of placing ethics particularly on 
humans. Conversely, Heidegger’s understanding of building as handi-craft ties building, thinking, and 
language together. It also reveals a way to ontologically demarcate between humans and animals within 
Vogel’s philosophy. On animality, Heidegger writes: 
In the common view, the hand is part of our bodily organism. But the hand’s essence can never be 
determined, or explained, by its being an organ which can grasp. Apes, too, have organs that can 
grasp, but they do not have hands. The hand is infinitely different from all grasping organs --paws, 
claws, or fangs-- different by an abyss of essence. Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can 
have hands and can be handy in achieving works of handicraft (Heidegger 1976, p.16). 
Heidegger thinks that apes cannot grasp because they cannot speak and cannot think. This is just 
like how Vogel thinks that apes (or any natural things, for that matter) cannot have ethics because they 
cannot speak or have dialogue.5 The hand is a particularly human thing that differs from animals’ 
grasping organs based on thought and language. They also allow us to build in a unique way, as handi-
craft.  
If we consider Heidegger’s hands in Vogel’s philosophy, then we can separate humans and nature 
in the ways that they build the environment. From here, we can interpret hands as carrying a particular 
responsibility, as opposed to the lack of responsibility that comes with the simple grasping organs of 
animals or the complete lack of hands for any other natural thing. Heidegger does not explicitly connect 
hands and responsibility in this way. However, we can argue that because we have hands, we have a 
                                                 
5 The necessity of language for morality in animals is also disputed. See Bekoff and Pierce (2009), 
Shapiro (2006), or DeGrazia (1996). I will discuss this more in full in the next chapter. 
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unique responsibility for the things that we build. I will refrain from giving too close of an analysis of 
Heidegger’s hands and why we can assign responsibility through them, for it lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. On the surface, however, we are responsible for our handi-craft because we think and are 
intentional about how we build. Animals do not think about the things they build, thus they are not 
morally responsible for them. Thus, if we accept that humans have hands and animals do not, then we can 
say that when humans build the environment, they are responsible for it; when animals (and all other 
natural things) build the environment, they are not. 
Above, I outlined a couple of ways that Heidegger and Vogel seem to agree on their 
understandings of language, thinking, and building. And thus, hands seem to be a natural fit into Vogel’s 
philosophy. However, upon further analysis, Heidegger’s understanding of thinking and building may be 
too contradictory for Vogel’s philosophy to accommodate for ‘handi-craft’. 
In In the Swarm, Byung-Chul Han notes that “Heidegger removes the hand from the sphere of 
action and situates it in relation to thought. Its essence is not ethos but logos” (Han 2017, p.38, emphasis 
in original). Because “[a]ll the work of the hand is rooted in thinking” (Heidegger 1976, p.16), the hand 
acts, but it does not act “in terms of vita activa” (Han 2017, p.37, emphasis in original). In other words, 
“Heidegger’s hand thinks instead of acting” (Han 2017, p.37, emphasis mine).  
This is the opposite of Vogel. For Vogel, thinking (as in ‘thinking like a mall’) derives from 
building. For Vogel, “[p]ractices are our way of coming to know the world --they are… our way of being-
in-the-world” (Vogel 2015, p.56). Our practices are always changing and building the world around us. 
Furthermore, the ways people think (and in particular how they think about nature) “in hunter-gatherer or 
agricultural or ancient urban or feudal or industrial or postindustrial societies… are expressions of the fact 
that… [these] societies engage in different kinds of practices” (p.57). For Vogel, thinking forms ideal 
intentions. It does not build material things. Rather, the complete opposite: our practices inform our 
ideals. 
Where “Heidegger’s hand thinks instead of acting,” Vogel’s hand acts instead of thinking (Han, 
2017, p.37). Vogel’s hand would have to manifest itself as a manual operation to build a material thing, 
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like a crew of workers literally constructing a mall. However, Heidegger’s hand does not “manifest itself 
as a manual operation [Handlung] but… as handwriting” (Han 2017, p.37). Vogel’s hand acts in terms of 
vita activa instead of writing. This may be grounds enough to reject Heidegger’s hands as a possibility to 
adopt into Vogel’s philosophy. Thus, it seems that a more suitable alternative to provide a solution to 
Vogel’s contradiction of building and responsibility must conform to Vogel’s materialism. We turn to 
Marx to provide such a solution. 
 
Section Four: Marx 
Vogel draws from Marx’s labor by taking building as a social, material practice. We build the 
environment like a crew of workers builds a mall. We emancipate ourselves from alienation when we 
understand that the environment is built in this way. Vogel’s thesis of material construction arises from 
the notion that we are alienated from the environment (i.e. ‘nature’). Usually, this means that modernity 
has lost a connection with nature; thus, we “ignore the impact of our actions on it” (Vogel 2015, p.66). 
Environmental ethics, under this view, ought to restore our connection with nature by making sure that 
more people go camping in pristine forests and sparkling rivers to realize that these ‘natural’ things are 
more than commodities. Vogel returns alienation to Marx in order to critique the notion of nature and 
derive an environmental ethics and a politics without it. 
Marx (drawing on Hegel) writes that the worker is alienated from their labor, when “the object 
which labor produces, its product, stands opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the 
producer;” as a physical manifestation of the power that the property owner has over the worker  (Marx 
[1844] 1975, p.324, emphasis in original). “The worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien 
object” (p.324, emphasis in original). For example, if Jane spends an afternoon sanding and squaring off 
the corner cuts of a cabinet, this cabinet is bound only to be separated from her by the owner of the of the 
cabinet-making shop. The cabinet appears to her as “loss of realization,” as “loss of the object and 
bondage to it; appropriation [by the owner] as estrangement, as alienation” (p.324, emphasis in original).  
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To be alienated from the environment, then, is not to be separated from ‘nature’: to live on 
pavement instead of prairie grass. We are alienated from the environment when it appears to us as a loss 
of realization. We do not realize our own labors produce “the environment in which we live, the homes 
and offices within which we work,” and even “the very clothing that we wear and the food we eat” (Vogel 
2015, p.86). Those of us that produce might be able to recognize some of the individual things we 
produce as our own. Collectively, however, we do not recognize our actions in the environment as a 
whole. Each time we drive a car and emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Each time someone eats 
fried chicken, the entire supply chain from egg to farm to slaughter to table, all the workers and emissions 
associated, affect the environment. Rather than recognizing that our actions deeply affect how the 
environment is built, we only see our private actions: driving to work in the morning, eating chicken at 
lunch, etc. 
Thus, “[i]t is precisely in this failure of humans to ‘see themselves in the world they have created’ 
that their alienation consists” (Vogel 2015, p.72). To consider the environment as built is to realize 
ourselves in nature and emancipate ourselves from alienation. Nature is apart of human practices and, 
conversely, humans and practices are apart of nature. To recognize the full extent of our practices and our 
labors is to understand that nature is an obsolete term. This is what is encapsulated in considering the 
environment as built, i.e. to think like a mall. This is how to emancipate oneself from alienation from the 
environment.  
Just as alienated labor forms Marx’s understanding of labor, alienation from the environment 
forms Vogel’s understanding of building: 
To see humans as part of the world, as entwined with the world, would be to see in each object in 
one’s environment a history of human practice, and at the same time to recognize that humans don’t 
think or intend or imagine or perceive or reason or even somehow magically constitute the world but 
rather engage in practice within the world (Vogel 2015, p.94, emphasis in original). 
Here, Vogel outlines a way to emancipate ourselves from alienation: through an understanding of 
building as practice. Specifically, Vogel considers building as a social, material practice; he draws this 
from Marx’s notion of labor. Marx’s writing on alienation and labor directly forms Vogel’s 
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understanding of building. Thus, Marx gives us a good second solution to ontologically demarcate 
humans and animals in Vogel’s philosophy. 
In precisely the passage from the 1844 Manuscripts that Vogel draws from to understand 
alienation, he omits Marx’s discussion on human nature and animality. Marx writes that  
animals also produce. They build themselves nests and dwellings, like the bee, the beaver, the ant, 
etc. But they produce only their immediate need or those of their young; they produce one-sidedly, 
whilst man produces universally; they produces only when immediate physical need compels them to 
do so, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces in freedom 
from such need; they produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature. (1975, 
p.329). 
Furthermore, Marx declares that, through production “man really proves himself to be a species-being” 
(1975, p.329, emphasis in original). Marx draws the line between humans and animals based on how we 
each produce based on need, universality, and species-being. Animals, in opposition, produce only for 
immediate need; they produce one-sidedly, for themself or their young. For example, a hyena tears flesh 
off a carcass to feed itself. It does not act beyond its immediate need. It feeds itself only; not its peers; 
especially not any other animal or thing beyond its own species. Thus, it only produces one-sidedly. For 
Marx, this is essentially how all animals produce. 
 Humans, on the other hand, have the capacity to produce beyond their immediate need in accord 
with their species-being. Marx writes that “free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of 
man” (p.328). Whereas the animal “is immediately one with its life activity” and, like the hyena, only 
produces to sustain its own life, man “makes his life activity itself an object of his will and 
consciousness” (p.328). Thus, humans are conscious of our own actions in a way that animals are not. 
This makes us able to produce, even when we are free from immediate physical need. 
 Furthermore, producing free from need is not simply a way of producing based on your private 
whims. Humans are conscious of their own species-being when they produce in accord with both their 
individual humanity and with a larger collective body within which they work. In On the Jewish 
Question, Marx writes that man will “become a species-being” when “the real, individual man has 
absorbed into himself the abstract citizen” (1972, p.46). When you produce like an abstract citizen, you 
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produce for the good of society and of humanity. Beyond that even, Marx writes that “man reproduces the 
whole of nature” in that man can consider all of nature when he produces. Thus, humans are capable of 
producing when they are free from immediate need in such a way that they are conscious of the collective 
social, or even biotic, context of their labors. This sets human practices apart from those of animals. 
 If we incorporate building as production into Vogel’s philosophy along with Marx’s notion of 
species-being, we can argue that humans are uniquely capable of being morally responsible for the things 
they build. Even after discussing species-being above, it may not be entirely clear what Marx means by 
this piece of jargon. I read Marx simply as saying that humans are capable of being conscious of their 
practices both at an individual level and with regards to a larger social context, e.g. their neighborhood, 
their community, their species (humans), other species, or even the whole of earth. In fact, the individual 
and the social are not separate for Marx: he writes that “[w]hen man confronts himself, he also confronts 
other men” (1975, p.330).6 Because humans have this capacity to understand the social implications of 
what they build, they have moral obligations to others that are affected and they may be morally 
responsible for what they build. Animals, as well as all other natural organisms, are not capable of 
understanding their practices in a social context. Thus, they are not morally responsible for what they 
build. Solely humans are morally responsible for what they build. 
 This solution is preferable to Heidegger’s because it fits best with Vogel’s understanding of 
building as a social, material practice. Furthermore, adopting Marx’s understanding of building as 
producing in accordance with species-being into Vogel’s philosophy has nice implications for an ethics 
and a politics that align very well with those of Vogel. 
 
Section Five: Ethical and Political Implications 
 There seems to be a bit of a hitch with adopting Marx’s solution forthright. Marx considers 
production in accordance with species-being (read: building in a social context) an ideal situation. It is 
                                                 
6 This is rather like in Sources of Normativity where Christine Korsgaard (1996) argues that one has 
obligations to others and to humanity simply based on one’s capacity to see oneself as human (p.143). 
  
17 
 
more of an eschatological ideal than an actual reality. Under our current economic organization, our labor 
is alienated. Workers do not offer their labor in order to produce things that benefit themselves and their 
society. They do so because they need to get a wage. Their labor power is converted into an object --a 
product-- and stripped away from them by their boss or sold on the market in order to get money in 
return. The objects that workers produce confront them as alien powers: as reminders of their wage-labor 
relationship and the loss of realization of their labor power.  
For most, this means that you get up and produce only so that you can get enough money to pay 
for rent and food: basic means of staying alive. Whereas the emancipated man is a conscious being in that 
“his own life is an object for him, only because he is a species-being” and that “his activity [is] free 
activity,” alienated labor “reverses the relationship so that man, just because he is a conscious being, 
makes his life activity, his being [Wesen], a mere means for his existence” (1975, p.328). Thus, producing 
for wages drives workers to produce for immediate need. 
This makes it so that workers do not realize the social nature of the things that they produce. 
Marx writes that a consequence of “man’s estrangement from the product of his labour, his life activity, 
his species-being, is estrangement of man from man” (p.330). Thus, not only does alienation cause a 
worker to produce only for themselves, but they lose the capacity to realize that their labor is connected to 
a larger society as a whole. 
In all, alienated labor reduces the human capacity for production to its animal base. Marx writes: 
“In general, the proposition that man is estranged from his species-being means that each man is 
estranged from the others and that all are estranged from man’s essence” (p.330). Alienated labor 
“transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken 
from him” (p.329). When humans produce for a wage, they produce only for “greed, and the war of the 
avaricious – competition” (p.323). This is no better than the hyena. Alienation reduces human production 
into private, selfish affairs that only sustain life for the worker. As a result, the worker “feels that he is 
acting freely only in his animal functions --eating, drinking and procreating, or at most in his dwelling and 
adornment-- while in his human functions he is nothing more than an animal” (p.327, emphasis mine). 
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This seems like a hitch in my formulation of Marx’s definition of moral agency, i.e. an agent 
capable of producing in accord with species-being, because it seems like it would excuse all humans that 
produce under alienation of moral responsibility for what they build.7 Let me sketch this out here. Blame 
is assigned only to agents who produce within a social context. Animals do not have moral responsibility 
because they do not produce in accord with species-being. Humans are reduced to the level of animals 
when they produce under alienation. Thus, it seems as though humans would be as morally responsible 
for the things that they create under alienation as animals are. That is to say, humans would not be 
morally responsible at all for their environmental practices (like animals). 
 This is partially true. Humans build the environment at a collective scale. Our societies, their 
economic organization, their geographical organization, and their cultural standards lead us to act in ways 
that create the environment. We don’t decide, on an individual level, these larger ways of organizing 
socially. This is a point that Vogel explicates well. He writes: 
Each morning I make an implicit decision about whether to drive to work or not: driving generates 
a certain amount of carbon dioxide and therefore helps to increase the future temperature of the 
planet. Not driving would cause me to lose my job (Vogel 2015, p.203). 
This problem has to do with the “private character of the decision with which [he is] faced” (p.202). 
“Operating within a market economy, [people] have to act as private individuals whose acts are 
independent of the actions of others” (p.202). Our actions are made to seem private when, in fact, they 
add up to build the environment. “Global warming is a social product” (p.202). Yet, it is an alien power 
that arises when we do not recognize the sociality of our practices. This is “the structure that Marx 
described under the name of alienation” (p.202). 
 Because our practices are made to be private by the social and economic conditions we live in, we 
are ignorant of the particular consequences of our environmental actions. Only the best climatologists 
understand the impact of the carbon they emit when they drive to work; and, even then, they can only 
                                                 
7 This does not mean that people that produce under alienation are not culpable for any of their actions: if 
you work for a wage and you stab someone out of cold blood on the street, you should still be blamed for 
murder. I am mainly thinking of things you build when you produce for a wage under a boss. 
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understand the impact of their emissions indirectly, within a collective of toxic commuters. These actions 
are not intentional. Nobody wants global warming. They simply accept it because they want food and 
shelter and energy and entertainment and the ways we get those things currently comes with a steep 
environmental price. Finally, these actions are not entirely voluntary.8 Vogel does not have a choice 
whether or not to drive to work. He alone cannot rebuild the entire highway system, create more public 
buses, or move his work closer to his neighborhood. 
 To be blamed for one’s actions, a moral agent must (1) not be ignorant of the particular 
consequences of their actions, (2) they have to act somewhat intentionally (in a non-negligent manner), 
and (3) they have to act voluntarily.9 However, as I argued above, individuals that build the environment 
through their private, alienated practices do so ignorantly, unintentionally, and involuntarily. Thus, one 
cannot be blamed for their individual environmental practices. For example, we ought not to blame Vogel 
for the environmental harms caused by driving to work. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) would argue 
the same: that an individual has “no moral obligations not to waste gas” when they drive to work in the 
morning (p.312). Sinnott-Armstrong argues this for different reasons. He thinks the consequences of our 
individual actions are negligible. While I don’t entirely agree that the environmental consequences are 
null, I do think that Sinnott-Armstrong captures a powerful point about the very small, practically 
imperceptible impacts that individuals have within our environment. 
Though our individual actions are, to an extent, involuntary --like Vogel being forced to drive to 
work in the morning,-- Sinnott-Armstrong argues that “governments still have moral obligations to fight 
global warming, because they can make a difference” (p.312, emphasis mine). Sinnott-Armstrong is 
arguing not that we ought to blame governments; but, rather that they have a forward-looking 
responsibility to make the environment better, because they have the power to effect this change. This 
                                                 
8 This point may be contentious with regards to Aristotle’s definition of voluntary action. Aristotle only 
considers actions under the most extreme forms of duress to be involuntary. 
9 I will discuss blameworthiness, ignorance, intentionality, and voluntary action more in Chapter Three. 
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does not entirely capture the sense of moral responsibility that I have been discussing.10 However, it does 
capture the sense in which moral obligations should be assigned on a larger social level. 
While our individual actions may seem inconsequential, our collective actions obviously make a 
difference. We collectively build the environment. However, we do so as an aggregate of our individual 
actions. Once we recognize the power that we hold as a society --Sinnott-Armstrong would say, that the 
government holds,-- we have the capacity to collectivize and lead the direction of our society towards 
more environmentally-sound practices. This is Vogel’s notion of “discursive democracy” (p.236). 
Even if we cannot assign individual moral responsibility for our environmental practices, I think 
we can understand environmental responsibility as a kind of indirect, shared responsibility derived from 
our proximity to the collective. Based on my definition of moral agency from Marx, we are morally 
responsible if we can understand the impact of our actions on a larger social level beyond simply 
ourselves and our children. We may not be able to fully understand how our individual actions directly 
affect the environment, but we can understand how they do when we consider ourselves as part of a 
society that may change by changing how our society is organized. Thus, I think that those who may 
understand and are more able to affect how our society is organized ought to be more morally responsible 
for their environmental actions. 
Vogel recognizes this as a democratic process. It seems as though all citizens in an 
environmentally-harmful democracy may be morally responsible for their society’s environmental 
actions. Yet, not all are equal in a democracy. A factory owner chooses to build a plant on a river because 
it’s cheaper to produce their goods. Individual consumers that buy the factory owner’s products are 
implicitly supporting the factory and its harmful environmental actions. The workers, the consumers, and 
the factory owner are morally responsible in that they are all citizens in the society that produces a factory 
that pollutes. They all have the means to realize how the structure of their society leads to harmful 
environmental actions. They all have the means to collectively organize and lead their society in a 
                                                 
10 See Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist’s 2017 work or Chapter Three for a larger discussion of the distinction 
between forward- and backward-looking responsibility.  
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different direction. Thus, they are all morally responsible for the collective actions of their society in that 
they have the ability to organize and create new policies or social rules that lead to better environmental 
actions. However, this is not to say that they have equal responsibility. The factory owner, who chooses 
where the factory is built, has more of a say in controlling the means of production than a factory worker 
does. On Marx’s formulation of responsibility, we may say that the factory owner understands the larger 
social impact of their actions --since they can see the big picture of how the factory will affect its 
customers, workers, and the land that it pollutes-- better than any individual worker can. One’s moral 
responsibility for the environment is lessened if they have a lessened say in society. Marginalized people 
or people in poverty, who do not have a voice in the decisions of their workplace or their government, are 
much less responsible for the society’s environmental actions than privileged, rich citizens with a lot of 
political clout. 
 I think that one may be excused for their individual environmental actions, for one, if they are 
ignorant of consequences. Driving your car and emitting greenhouse gases is  like going to the polls, 
adding your small vote to the pool of millions of other voters. When we vote little individual effect and 
it’s difficult to see exactly where our vote goes, since it is lost in a sea of statistics after we count it. This 
is the same with environmental practices. However, when we vote for a candidate we approve of, we are 
still slightly swaying the collective choice of a representative towards that candidate. We can see that our 
vote is counted towards the right candidate on a larger collective scale. One may be ignorant of the direct 
consequences and still be able to be blamed for voting for the wrong candidate, knowing fully well that 
their vote counted against the right one. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that people at least have a 
general idea of what global warming or polluting is and can understand their actions, however small and 
private, as contributing to them. Understanding our actions within a collective is a means to show that we 
are still responsible for our actions. 
 
This is exactly what Vogel has in mind when he writes of social construction. To say that 
something is socially constructed usually implies that it is socially or culturally contingent. It is arbitrary 
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and can change. The logic goes: since we have socially constructed X, then we can socially construct X 
into Y. For example, if race is socially constructed, then our social ideals create hierarchies of power that 
marginalize certain racial groups; thus we, as a society, can change these divisions into something more 
equitable. Vogel, however, takes social construction as a physical process: “[h]uman beings effect a 
change in the world when they transform it through their physical actions, which is to say through their 
socially organized practices” (2015, p.42). Thus, “to say that X is ‘socially constructed’ would mean that 
socially organized human beings have built X, through process of labor” (p.56). 
By realizing that the environment is socially constructed and that it was constructed poorly (to 
create things like global warming or acid rain and massive species extinction) we are able to construct it 
anew. However, conceiving of construction as practice rather than theory is to see humans in the 
environment, but also to see that we are not masters of it: “[w]e do not ‘think’ of a world and then 
magically bring it into existence; the world is perfectly real and material, just as real and material as our 
activities are” (Vogel 2015, p.167). Constructing the environment better is not an easy process. It requires 
the environmental virtue of humility. 
Furthermore, realizing that the environment is socially constructed is a means to emancipate 
ourselves from alienation. In On the Jewish Question, Marx writes that man is fully emancipated when 
"he has recognized and organized his own powers as social powers so that he no longer separates this 
social power from himself as political power" (1972, p.46). For one to recognize their powers as social 
powers is to recognize the collective ways that we build the environment. It is to recognize that you and 
everyone else like you has to drive to work in the morning and, over time, that leads to a sizeable amount 
of pollution and carbon emissions. Only when we are unalienated can we build in a way that is in accord 
with species-being. Only when we understand our collective environmental impacts can we change them 
for the better. 
One promising way to do this is presented via the Anthropocene. ‘Anthropocene’ is a geological 
term for “the current epoch in which humans and our societies have become a global geophysical force” 
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(Steffen et al., 2007 p.614).11 The Holocene was the last geological epoch which encompasses the “past 
ten to twelve thousand years as agreed upon by the International Geological Congress in Bologna in 
1885” (p.615). In order to understand and acknowledge the ways that humans have altered and continue 
to alter the planet, a group of leading geologists at the International Geological Congress recommended 
that the geological community recognize the Anthropocene as fundamentally distinct from the Holocene 
(Carrington, 2016). Secondary scientific journals and major media outlets spread the news across the 
internet in order for everyday people to engage with and understand the ways our planet is deeply shaped 
by our actions, down to its geophysical foundations (see The New York Times’ or The Guardian’s series 
on the Anthropocene). It may be considered a strategic theory in order to guide public thought on how we 
ought to care for the environment and attempt to mitigate our detrimental practices. 
To justify these claims, epoch demarcation needs to be grounded in the rigorous scientific criteria 
that the Anthropocene is “functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene” (Waters et al., 
2016 p.1). This requires a solid basis of empirical evidence about changes in the Earth’s geological 
structure and a theoretical understanding of how these facts relate to human interaction. Geologists track 
seismic activity and the geological makeup of the Earth’s crust in order to measure significant changes 
over the last couple hundred years. These changes in the Earth’s geological makeup “began around 1800 
with the onset of industrialization, the central feature of which was the enormous expansion in the use of 
fossil fuels” (Steffen et al, 2007 p.614). Experts also cite nuclear waste and the enormous scale of 
domesticated chicken bones as major factors. Thus, the Anthropocene weds truth-seeking scientific 
machinery with the strategic goal of shifts public conceptions on how we relate to the environment.  
The Anthropocene is an exercise in understanding the breadth and depth of how human activity 
has constructed the environment. Humans have shaped the environment so thoroughly that we play a 
dominant role in the geophysical make-up of the earth’s crust. By illuminating our practices in 
constructing the environment, we become unalienated. Thus, we realize our moral responsibility. The 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that Vogel’s work serves as a critique of the natural-artificial fissure dominant in the 
geological sciences. 
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Anthropocene is one of the most promising attempts at understanding the weight of our environmental 
actions and inspiring collective action to construct the environment better. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Once we recognize the ways in which we have built nature and the ways that the things we have 
built are natural, we are able to consider how to change the ways we build the environment in order to 
build it better. In order to do so, however, we first need to realize that the environment is not external to 
us. When we “mistake the environment for nature, failing to recognize that what surrounds us is not 
‘natural’ at all but rather a world that we have built,” we fail to see our responsibility for that environment 
(Vogel 2015, p.92). However, to have an impact on the environment is not like a roof that you stand upon 
and hammer a nail into, having an impact on the roof. It’s not an independent natural world that humans 
impress upon, but do not reside in. The environment is an artifact. To see ourselves in it, actively 
constructing it is to see ourselves as morally responsible for it. Instead of a roof, Vogel’s environment is 
like the house that we live in. Improving our environment, then, should be like painting the walls or fixing 
the faucet. We are responsible for our environment as we are responsible for our house. 
Furthermore, nothing else is morally responsible for how they build the house. Animals and other 
natural organisms are simply causally responsible for how they build the environment. Because Vogel’s 
philosophy blurs the lines between natural and artificial, he runs the risk of saying that humans and 
natural things build in similar ways. This leads to a contradiction. In order to avoid this contradiction, I 
have laid out two solutions that Vogel can incorporate into his philosophy. The first, from Heidegger, 
separates humans and animals based on hands. Vogel may take building as handi-craft into order to create 
a consistent philosophy of moral responsibility. Yet, this solution suffers since Heidegger does not treat 
building completely materially. The second, more promising solution, comes from Marx. Humans are 
able to produce free from need with an understanding of their self as human and as a part of a larger 
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social context, i.e. they are able to produce in accord with species-being. This solution ought to be 
adopted by Vogel. It also has the implications that environmental responsibility is diminished for 
individuals that produce under alienation. 
Vogel urges that we understand the ways that the environment is built. This comes first by 
understanding how we build it differently than everything else. My suggestions for demarcating humans 
and nature based on how they build is largely a technical point; it clears up an inconsistency in Vogel’s 
philosophy. However, it also implies a more consistently humanistic environmental philosophy that fits 
well with the rest of Vogel’s work. 
Most importantly, Vogel’s work gives us the theoretical tools to understand how the environment 
is built poorly and how to fix it. This is no small task. It requires humility in the face of material 
structures: city planning, highway systems, or social hierarchies like race or class. Vogel writes that  
an environmentalism after the end of nature would call not for practices that protect nature (which 
doesn’t exist)... or even for ones that protect the “environment” (because that would mean protecting 
shopping malls and coal-burning power plants and all the other horrors that environ us), but rather for 
practices in which the actors acknowledge and take communal responsibility for their transformative 
effects on the world, doing so via the procedures of discursive democracy (Vogel 2015, p.231). 
Vogel’s philosophy can be summed up very nicely in a quote from a review of Thinking Like a Mall: 
“Instead of environmental ethics urging us to commune with nature, it should thus focus on community 
organizing and political philosophy” (Jeremy Bendik-Keymer 2016, p.508). 
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Chapter Two: Moral Agency in Animals and Machines 
In the last chapter, I argued for ontological distinctions between humans and animals in order to 
absolve any non-human organisms of moral responsibility. First, I introduced the notion of the hand from 
Heidegger. The hand is often touted for its incredible dexterity and as a key evolutionary feature that 
made humans, out of all other species, able to develop advanced tools and technology. Heidegger goes 
further than physical nimbleness and ties the hand to human’s unique capacity to think and converse. 
Heidegger thinks that no other animal, even our closest cousin, the ape, has hands for they do not have 
language or thought. Based on this, I argued that humans are solely morally responsible for their actions: 
that humans are the only ones capable of understanding the full extent of their handi-craft. Thus, out of all 
organisms who build, only humans are responsible for the building they do. 
Second, I introduced Marx’s notion of production in accordance with species-being. Species-
being is the capacity for consciousness of one’s actions on both an individual and a social level; the social 
can be a consideration within a human society, between species, or about the whole of the environment. 
Animals do not produce in accord with their species-being. They produce only for the need to survive: 
this drives them to produce entirely individualistically. Humans, on the other hand, can produce even 
when they don’t need to. They can build things that benefit themselves, their neighbors, their country, the 
entire human race, or the entire world. They can also build things that harm these groups. Because they 
are able to be conscious of how their actions play out in a social context, they are able to be held morally 
responsible for their actions. Animals do not have the capacity to understand their actions beyond 
themselves or their offspring; thus, they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. 
For anyone that has seen or heard of Koko the gorilla or Kanzi the chimpanzee, Heidegger’s 
characterization of apes seems empirically false. Both of these apes spoke sign language and could 
express simple thoughts. Moreover, even animals with no linguistic capabilities (at least as far as we can 
tell) have capabilities that are fundamental to thinking: intentionality, understanding of causality, and 
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planning.12 Based on new research into animal behavior, we have strong grounds to doubt Heidegger’s 
claim that only humans have hands. 
As well, a strong form of Marx’s thesis about animals (that they do not think past themselves and 
their young) is obviously empirically false. Animals from ants to apes organize in cooperative social 
communities. Animals have shown to be empathetic and show concern for the interests of others, beyond 
their offspring. However, there is something to be said about a weaker form of Marx’s definition, here 
humans can have a larger social understanding of their actions and animals can have only a restricted, 
local understanding of their actions. Even if animals can think beyond themselves and their offspring, 
most, if not all, cannot consider the interests of other species or of the entire world. This is a more 
plausible interpretation of Marx’s thesis on animality (though it might not be true to Marx’s original 
intentions.)  
In either case, Heidegger’s or Marx’s, the assumptions about animality are beginning to come 
undone. The last fifty years have seen an explosion of research and attention to the behavior of animals. 
Our presumptions, in daily life and in philosophy, about animals are coming into question. For example, 
empirical examples of animal tool use have grown by orders of magnitude since the early 1960’s. Jane 
Goodall’s observations of “David Greybeard using a blade of grass to get termites out of a hole” broke the 
first crack in the facade of the notion of man as Homo faber, i.e. the sole species that had “evolved the 
necessary skills to manufacture and use tools” (Bekoff and Pierce 2009, p.20). More recently, Ashley 
Shew Heflin’s (2011) dissertation and (2017) book on animal construction and tool use argues that many 
of these recent case studies as indicative of a capacity for technology in certain animals.13 Rather than 
treating human and animal constructions as different in kind, Heflin argues that they should be considered 
different in degree only. Beyond a few cases of simple tool use, robust technological knowledge is now 
seen in a wide variety of animals, including primates, cetaceans, and birds (especially corvids).  
                                                 
12 Though, what Heidegger means by thinking here is not the common notion of thinking. 
13 Ashley Shew goes by ‘Ashley Shew’ rather than ‘Ashley Shew Heflin’ now. When referring to her 
(2011) dissertation, I use ‘Heflin’. When referring to her (2017) book, I use ‘Shew’. 
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Thus far, I have argued that humans are uniquely morally responsible because they are distinct 
from animals. Particularly, I argued that we build differently. Yet, Heflin argues that this difference is not 
a difference in kind, but simply a difference in degree. If this argument proves to be fruitful, my adoption 
of Heidegger’s and Marx’s definitions (which are based on building) are incorrect. Then, how are we to 
assign moral responsibility? If building implies moral responsibility and animals build to a certain degree, 
then ought we consider that they are also morally responsible to a degree? Or should we simply find 
better criteria to distinguish humans from animals, in terms of moral responsibility? There are pressing 
critiques of antiquated presumptions about the differences between humans and animals based on recent 
case studies on animal behavior.  Now, what is to distinguish humans from animals as responsible moral 
agents? 
This chapter will address this concern.  I’d like to consider how recent critiques of the human-
animal distinction affect animals as responsible moral agents. I will begin by outlining basic notions of 
personhood and moral responsibility. Then, I will consider morality and moral responsibility in animals. I 
will introduce a novel argument for moral agency in animals. This is an argument about the principles for 
moral agency between the fields of animal ethics and robot ethics. I argue that, under the robot ethicists’ 
definitions, certain animals may be moral agents and show that this leads to a reductio ad absurdum. 
Hence, the standards of moral agency from robot ethics ought to be reconsidered in order to maintain 
consistency with animal ethics, rather than the other way around. Finally, I will conclude by rejecting 
moral responsibility in animals and machines.  
 
 Section One: Persons and Reasons for Moral Responsibility 
Traditionally, only humans have been considered moral. This can be considered as two 
capacities: moral action and moral responsibility. The latter capacity, moral responsibility, is determined 
by personhood: only persons can be morally responsible. Moral responsibility is the capacity for an agent 
to be blamed or praised for their actions. Harry Frankfurt (1971) defines personhood by second-order 
volition. He writes that first-order desires are “desires to do or not to do one thing or another” (p.7). 
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Second-order desires are desires about desires: e.g. if an alcoholic does not want to feel the desire to 
drink. Second-order volition arises out of second-order desires; it is someone’s want for a desire to bring 
them into action. For example, if an alcoholic wants to drink because they want to taste a beer and not 
because they have a craving for alcohol. Frankfurt writes that having second order volition is “essential to 
being a person” (p.10). It is also essential to being a responsible moral agent. The criterion for moral 
responsibility, in this case, is “the capacity for reflective self-evaluation” (p.7). Frankfurt writes that this 
capacity is absent in animals other than man. Frankfurt’s criterion for moral responsibility is agent-based, 
in that it is strictly concerned with the mental state of a moral agent; only beings that can have second-
order volition can be moral agents. By moral agent, I simply mean a being that can act morally and be 
morally responsible for one’s actions. 
John Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) give another highly influential account of moral 
responsibility. Their theory suggests that moral responsibility hinges on a weak form of reason-
responsiveness, i.e. the capacity for a person to do otherwise based on a reason to do so. A strong form of 
reason-responsiveness is regulative control, i.e. the ability to regulate between a number of alternate 
possibilities and decide how to act. Fischer and Ravizza argue that a weaker kind of control, guidance 
control “grounds moral responsibility for actions” (p.54). Even in a metaphysically-deterministic system, 
an agent may have guidance control if the mechanism that drives their actions is reasons-responsive. This 
means that the mechanism that drives their actions would respond differently if given different reasons. 
Though this theory of moral responsibility requires a low threshold of consciousness and deliberation in 
order to respond to moral reasons; it primarily focuses on the mechanism involved in acting. Thus, it is a 
mechanism-based account of moral responsibility. 
In “Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents,” Deborah G. Johnson (2006) lists five 
criteria that “[c]ontemporary action theory typically specifies… for human behavior to be considered 
action” i.e. “behavior arising from moral agency” (p.198-199). These include: 
1) An agent with an internal state consisting of desires, beliefs, or other intentional states; 
2) An outward event where the agent moves their body or an extension of their body; 
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3) The internal state causes the outward event; 
4) The outward event has an outward effect beyond the agent’s body; and 
5) The effect is received by a patient (p.198). 
In order to determine whether a being is an agent that can be morally responsible for their actions, 
one would consider whether their behaviors fulfill each criterion on this list. If a being X is not a moral 
agent and is not morally responsible for their actions, one need only show that their behaviors do not 
fulfill one or more of the items on this list. In Section 3, I will explain further how Johnson argues against 
attributing moral agency to computer systems. However, for now I simply adopt Johnson’s criteria as 
standard for attributing moral agency. I prefer Johnson’s criteria for moral action because (1) and (3) 
align with Frankfurt’s agent-based criterion and (2) and (4) align with Fischer and Ravizza’s mechanism-
based criterion for moral agency. 
 Johnson’s criterion (5) requires that an agent’s moral action be received by a moral 
patient. To understand what a moral patient is, I turn to animal ethicists who argue that animals are moral 
patients. This will lead to a further discussion on the moral status of animals. 
 
Section Two: Moral Animals 
There is practically unanimous consensus that moral responsibility is absent in nonhuman 
animals. However, this does not preclude animals from being considered morally. David DeGrazia (2002) 
writes that “[i]ncreasingly many people claim that animals have moral status, moral rights, or both” 
(p.13). To say that an animal has moral status is to say that the animal “has moral importance in her own 
right and not simply in relation to humans” (p.13). 
 Tom Regan (1983) makes the distinction between moral agents and moral patients in 
order to argue for the moral status of animals. Regan asserts that moral agents “are individuals who have 
a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to 
bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this 
determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality --however it is conceived of-- requires” 
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(p.151). Moral patients, on the other hand, “lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their 
own behavior in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they do” (p.152). They lack 
“the ability to formulate, let alone bring to bear, moral principles in deliberating about which one among a 
number of possible acts it would be right or proper to perform” (p.152). Thus, they cannot be held 
morally responsible for their actions as moral agents can. However, moral patients can be considered “on 
the receiving end of the right or wrong acts of moral agents” (p.154). This is what Johnson (2006) means 
in her criterion (5) for action. Regan argues that animals are not moral agents because they do not have 
the capability to freely choose between moral principles. However, he also holds that animals have 
inherent value because they are subjects-of-a-life, i.e. that they have some capacity for emotions, 
intentionality, and self-awareness, among other cognitive capabilities. A generous reading of Regan 
suggests that an animal need only sentience to be a subject-of-a-life (see Mary Anne Warren’s 1987 
critique of Regan). Because animals have inherent value, they can be treated as moral patients. This gives 
animals a moral status. 
Regan’s grounds for moral responsibility require 1) a sophisticated agent who can enumerate 
their moral principles, and 2) free action that affords the agent a kind of control. The first criterion is 
agent-based, similar to Frankfurt’s. This criterion is also not posited by Regan alone. Evelyn Pluhar 
(1995) also argues that the ability to formulate and motivate action through moral principles is the 
threshold for moral agency. I think this criterion is too strong; it relies on human-like linguistic abilities. 
There is plenty of evidence of animals --dolphins, whales, great apes-- with the ability to communicate 
and use language in a way that does not look like human speech and symbols. There is also plenty of 
evidence of animals behaving in seemingly moral ways without any linguistic ability. I will discuss these 
in more detail later when considering the works of Shapiro (2006), Bekoff and Pierce (2009), and 
Rowlands (2012). For now, it suffices to say that a weaker criterion than Regan’s can be adopted as an 
agent-based threshold for moral responsibility. 
Regan’s second criterion can also be supplanted with a weaker one. This criterion is mechanism-
based. Regan would likely endorse a kind of regulative control, which necessitates alternate possibilities 
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to choose from, as a threshold for moral agency. Instead, I adopt Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) guidance 
control as the principle underlying moral responsibility. I think that guidance control is also consistent 
with Johnson’s third criterion for moral responsibility. Johnson simply specifies that the internal state of 
the agent must cause an outward event: she does not say that this cause need be a free choice between a 
number of alternate possible outward events and decide which to act towards.     
With these weaker criteria for moral agency, some argue that animals can be moral agents. Since 
Darwin and (more recently) Frans de Waal (2006), animal researchers and theorists have recognized the 
biological foundations for morality in animals. Many times, ethologists (animal behavior scientists) 
describe behaviors such as altruism or cooperation among animals as prosocial in that they benefit not 
only the individual, but a larger animal collective. For example, ants collectively carrying food and 
wolves playing together are both prosocial. 
In Wild Justice, Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce (2009) distinguish moral behaviors from “the 
more neutral and technical-sounding prosocial behaviors” (p.12). Ethologists describe behaviors such as 
altruism or cooperation as prosocial in order to avoid assuming that animals have morality. For example, 
both ants collectively carrying food and wolves playing together are prosocial. Bekoff and Pierce, 
however, argue that only the wolves’ behaviors can be considered moral. They define morality as a “suite 
of other-regarding behaviors falling into the three rough clusters of cooperation, empathy, and justice” 
(p.138). They define requirements for a species to have morality: 
1) “a level of complexity in social organization;” 
2) “a certain level of neural complexity;” 
3) “relatively advanced cognitive capacities;” and 
4) “a high level of behavioral flexibility” (Bekoff & Pierce 2009, p.13). 
On this account, certain highly social, intelligent animals act morally. Wolves meet all criteria. 
Moreover, when they play, they behave within strict, socially-determined rules: wolves do not bite too 
hard or hurt one another, lest they be chastised or bruised by the other wolves in the pack. Thus, when 
wolves play, Bekoff and Pierce would say this is moral behavior. Ants, on the other hand, meet criterion 
(1), and possibly criterion (2), depending on whether neural complexity can be considered at the level of 
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an entire colony; but, certainly they do not meet criteria (3) and (4); thus ants would not act morally. 
Bekoff and Pierce list many examples of animals acting in what they consider moral ways: elephants help 
injured or sick herdmates (p.84); bonobos and wolves share food (p.81, 85); rooks cooperate to gather 
food in controlled experiments (p.55); chimpanzees, hyenas, mice, and rats all forego food in order to 
save another of their species from pain (p.55-56). 
The example about hyenas, rats, and macaques comes from experiments wherein two animals are 
put in separate cages and punished for helping one another. Here is a description of two experiments 
delivered on rats: 
In 1959, Russell Church demonstrated that rats would not push a lever that delivered food if doing 
so caused other rats to receive an electric shock. In a similar vein, in 1962, George Rice and Priscila 
Gainer showed that rats would help other rats in distress. In their experiment, one rat was suspended 
by a harness, which would cause it distress that it manifested by squeaking and wriggling. Another rat 
could lower the suspended rat by pressing a lever, and this is what it, in fact, did (Rowlands 2012, 
p.7). 
Variants of these experiments were replicated among hyenas and macaques, with similar altruistic 
results. 
These behaviors are likely motivated by empathy. In an experiment on empathy in mice, Dale 
Langford et al. (2006) put two mice in a cage and injected one with acetic acid to put them in extreme 
pain. They then observed the reactions of the other mouse. The mice observing their cage-partner 
writhing in pain exhibited signs of distress and pain themselves. Langford et al. concluded that mice have 
at least basic capacities for empathy. Bekoff and Pierce, citing the same experiments from Church (1959) 
and Rice and Gainer (1962), note that empathy most likely played a part in the actions of these rats to pull 
the lever or not. It is reasonable to think that empathy played a part in the altruistic behaviors of hyenas 
and macaques as well. In general, certain animals can act for the interest of others, guided by internalized 
moral norms and motivated by empathy. Bekoff and Pierce would say they can be moral. 
Because they think animals can act morally, Bekoff and Pierce admit that animals must be able to 
be held morally responsible for some of their actions. However, because they argue that animals are moral 
agents “within the limited context of their own communities,” they argue that moral responsibility is 
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“species-specific and context-specific” (p.144). This is a kind of diminished moral responsibility. It 
precludes moral obligation in many situations for wild animals, e.g. “predatory behavior of a wolf toward 
an elk is amoral --it is not subject to condemnation or accolades” (p.145). 
Bekoff and Pierce do not give any concrete examples of an animal acting in a way that may be 
blameworthy or praiseworthy. Though they concede that animals are moral agents (in a diminished 
sense,) it is unclear how committed they are to this idea: it seems more like an afterthought in their work, 
a necessary position that must be taken after arguing that animals act morally. First, they do not give any 
concrete examples of animals acting in a way that may be blameworthy or praiseworthy. Second, they 
argue against the notions of agent and patient entirely. They think these terms are “likely to promote 
philosophical confusion and should ultimately be avoided” (p.145). 
Paul Shapiro (2006) also argues for a kind of species-relative account of moral agency in animals, 
wherein an animal has “responsibility only over the range of actions of which we are capable of moral 
understanding” (p.365). He gives examples to supplement his (and Bekoff and Pierce's) claims. If an 
animal decides to harm another, understanding the suffering it would cause, where the action is not 
needed for survival, Shapiro thinks this is blameworthy (p.365-366). For example, if a macaque in the 
experiments described above arbitrarily shocks another macaque (p.365). Or when a group of 
chimpanzees in Jane Goodall's research decided to brutally attack and kill one of their own (Shapiro 2006, 
p.366). Shapiro even gives examples of cross-species moral behavior that may be blameworthy. For 
example, Shapiro argues a dog may be blamed if she attacks her family members (p.368). Animals may 
also be praised. Binti Jua, an ape in the Brookfield Zoo, gently picked up and brought a 3-year-old boy to 
safety when he fell into the gorilla enclosure (p.367). Dolphins often hold drowning swimmers above 
water (p.367). Shapiro thinks these animals should be praised. Generally, if an animal can feel 
compassion for or understand the suffering of another species, Shapiro argues that they may be praised or 
blamed for their actions towards members of that species. 
In Can Animals Be Moral?, Mark Rowlands (2012) agrees with Shapiro and Bekoff and Pierce 
that animals can act morally; but, Rowlands does not think that animals can be moral agents, i.e. that they 
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can be morally responsible for their actions. This is a striking conclusion. To my knowledge, no other 
thinker has argued for a distinction between the ability to act for moral reasons and the capacity to be 
evaluated and judged based on those actions. Thus, I dedicate the next few paragraphs to espousing his 
argument. 
Rowlands' argues that animals can act motivated by moral emotions, i.e. emotions that have 
intentional content constituting moral reasons (p.35). Rowlands defines a moral emotion: 
An emotion, E, is morally laden if and only if (1) it is an emotion in the intentional, content-
involving, sense, (2) there exists a proposition, p, which expresses a moral claim, and (3) if E is not 
misguided, then p is true (p.69). 
 To unpack this definition, in (1): what we commonly call emotions can be unintentional 
moods, such as sadness caused by a chemical imbalance. They can also be intentional emotions in that 
they are directed at something. For example, if I am angry at my brother because he hit me, my anger is 
directed at my brother. In (2): this anger involves a moral judgment, i.e. that my brother is wrong to hit 
me. In (3): Rowlands argues that if a moral judgment does not fully explain one's emotional reaction. This 
can be if the emotional reaction is too weak or too strong relative to its cause. For example, if my brother 
hit me because I hit him first, then my judgment that did something wrong is too strong; it is hypocritical. 
My anger is misguided. However, if my brother hits me unnecessarily, then my anger is not misguided 
and the moral claim that my brother is wrong to hit me is true. 
Rowlands argues that we can ascribe propositional content to animal emotions (and beliefs) in 
human terms if there is a corresponding belief that may be expressed depending on how an animal 
experiences and represents the world. For example, we may say that Hugo the dog believes that “there is a 
squirrel in the tree,” if it is reasonable that Hugo has a corresponding belief of the squirrel and its relation 
to the tree in Hugo's terms, e.g. that “there is a chaseable thing up there” (p.59-61). It is reasonable to 
ascribe this belief to Hugo, since he can differentiate between things to chases and things to not. This 
avoids the problem of ascribing a belief or understanding of the human notions of ‘tree’ or ‘squirrel’ to 
Hugo in order to justify his belief in something that has similar content. Note that “there is a chaseable 
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thing up there” is only a stand-in for a possible belief of Hugo's. Since we cannot understand how an 
animal experiences or represents the world, we cannot express the content of an animal's beliefs. 
However, it is reasonable to ascribe some belief to certain animals –primarily social mammals and birds,– 
based on what we know of their intelligence and behaviors. 
In all, Rowlands argues that an animal can have an intentional emotion that contains a moral 
claim which is true if the emotion is not misguided. The moral claim involved in this moral emotion can 
be expressed in terms of human terms if it corresponds to a belief in the animal's terms. When a moral 
emotion that is not misguided motivates action in an animal, the animal acts for moral reasons. All of the 
examples from Shapiro and Bekoff and Pierce of rats, macaques, elephants, dolphins, or any other social 
mammals acting out of the interest of others are motivated by moral emotions such as compassion or 
empathy that constitute moral reasons to act out of concern for another. Thus, Rowlands would also argue 
that these animals act morally. Rowlands calls these animals moral subjects: they can act motivated by 
moral reasons. 
However, Rowlands does not think these animals are morally responsible for their actions; 
animals are not moral agents. Rowlands argues against a species- or context-specific definition of moral 
agency, which Shapiro and Bekoff and Pierce rely on in their claim that moral animals are moral agents. 
Rowlands argues that species- or context-specificity, which limits an agent’s actions to the limits of their 
group, is “incompatible with the idea that animals are moral patients” (Rowlands 2012, p.87). Rowlands 
notes that if a wolf is not morally responsible for eating a deer because the deer is not in the wolf’s moral 
context (Bekoff & Pierce 2009, p.145), then “why suppose that our behavior toward, for example, 
intensively raised pigs is a moral issue?” (Rowlands 2012, p.87-88). Thus, Shapiro’s and Bekoff and 
Pierce’s arguments for diminished moral agency in animals seem to be rooted in faulty notions of species- 
or context-specificity.   
Rowlands writes that our “folk conception” of responsibility involves (1) understanding and (2) 
control (p.240). These correspond to what I called agent-based and mechanism-based accounts of moral 
responsibility, respectively. Rowlands dismisses (2), the criterion of control, as “a spurious one” (p.240).  
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By this, he does not mean that having control over one’s actions is a spurious threshold for moral 
responsibility. Having control over one’s actions is necessary for an action to be voluntary and 
blameworthy (see Aristotle on voluntary actions). I prefer Fischer and Ravizza’s sense of guidance 
control. Rather, Rowlands means that higher-order abilities to scrutinize one’s own motivations do not 
necessarily imply that one has regulative control over their motivations (p.170-171).  
Instead of focusing on control, Rowlands defines moral agency based on criterion (1), 
understanding. Whereas a moral subject simply understands “that certain motives and actions are right” 
or wrong, a moral agent understands “why some motives and actions are right and some are wrong” 
(p.243). Rowlands notes that this requires some capacity to scrutinize one’s own motivations and actions 
(p.238). Thus, I think that conceptualizing of Rowlands’ criterion of understanding and Frankfurt’s 
criterion of second-order volition (which stresses simply understanding and not the ability to deliberately 
choose between wills) is the best way to understand an agent-based account of moral responsibility. If a 
being has the capacity to reflectively endorse (to borrow Christine Korsgaard’s 1996 phrase) one’s own 
motivations, not in the sense that they can deliberately choose between wills; but, rather simply as a 
means of understanding why some motivations and actions are better than others, then that being is a 
moral agent. 
In “Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility,” Bert Musschenga (2015) complements Rowlands’ 
agent-based account of moral responsibility with a mechanism-based one. Musschenga argues that animal 
behaviors are similar to humans’ habitual actions (p.53). Musschenga applies Fischer and Ravizza’s 
notion of guidance control to habitual actions. Musschenga argues that one can be reasons-responsive (see 
Section 1) via two mechanisms: “practical reason and non-deliberative habit” (p.53). Animals certainly do 
not have practical reason, since (as seen in the previous chapter) they cannot deliberate about their 
practical motivations and actions. In order to be reasons-responsive in the sense of non-deliberative 
habits, an actor need be able to exhibit what Musschenga calls intervention control, i.e. the ability to 
deliberately intervene in one’s habitual behavior and change them based on ad hoc reasons (p.54).  
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While moral animals can act motivated by moral emotions (which provide moral reasons) and 
have some form of self-control, they do not have the kind of deliberate, reasons-based intervention 
control that Musschenga has in mind. Nor do they have the kind of second-order volition necessary for 
understanding why certain motivations and actions are right or wrong. Thus, they are not moral agents. 
Even moral animals are not morally responsible for their actions. 
In summary, animals can be moral patients because they are sentient. This is practically 
ubiquitously agreed upon (see, for example, Peter Carruthers for one who disagrees). What is more 
controversial is whether they can act morally. Following the arguments and examples of Shapiro, Bekoff 
and Pierce, Rowlands, and Musschenga, I think that certain sophisticated, social animals can act morally. 
However, I also agree with Rowlands and Musschenga in that moral animals are not morally responsible 
for their actions, because they do not have second-order volition nor intervention control. 
 
Section Three: Responsible Robots 
In the section, I discussed the moral status of animals. I will now discuss the prominent claims 
around moral agency in machines.14 Whereas for animals, the greatest concern is with their protection and 
treating them with respect, robot ethicists are primarily concerned whether robots can be blamed. I will 
provide an overview of the prominent arguments for and against moral agency in robots. Concluding this 
section, I will condense these arguments into concrete criteria for moral agency in robots. In Section 4, I 
will extend these criteria to animals. I will argue by reductio that the criteria for moral agency in robot 
ethics are too weak in that they admit absurd animals to be considered moral agents. In order to prevent 
such absurd conclusions, animal and robot ethicists ought to align their studies more closely around the 
question of moral responsibility: I will present good criteria for moral agency that is consistent across 
fields. 
                                                 
14 Throughout this paper, I use the terms ‘machine’, ‘robot’, ‘artificial agent’ (AA), and ‘computer systems’ 
practically interchangeably. I prefer the term ‘machine’, since it describes a broad set of things similar to 
how the term ‘animals’ classifies a broad set of beings. Also, ‘robot’ has an unwanted, sci-fi connotation. 
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As in animal ethics, many robot ethicists argue that autonomous machines are moral subjects or 
moral entities but not moral agents (Johnson 2006; Sharkey 2017). However, unlike in animal ethics, this 
is not a universal view. There are significantly more robot ethicists who are willing to accept moral 
agency in machines than there are animal ethicists who accept moral agency in animals (see Floridi & 
Sanders 2004; Asaro 2006; Dodig-Crnkovic & Persson 2008; Hellström 2013; Floridi 2013). 
Thomas Hellström (2013) introduces the notion of autonomous power as a criterion to assigning 
moral responsibility to machines. Autonomous power denotes “the amount and level of actions, 
interactions and decisions an agent is capable of performing on its own” (Hellström 2013, p.4) 
Autonomous power is in contrast to autonomy, which Hellström considers as environmental awareness. 
Hellström argues that a certain level of a combination of autonomy and autonomous power is sufficient 
for assigning moral responsibility to machines. Where Johnson and Sharkey argue that machines will 
never be moral agents because their actions cannot be separated from those of their designers, Hellström 
argues that advanced autonomous machines may be capable of reaching a level of autonomy and 
independence in their actions and how they spontaneously respond to how their actions affect their 
environment. He suggests that machines may be punished or praised if they are sufficiently capable of 
learning from their actions. Ultimately, he concludes that moral responsibility ought to be considered as a 
matter of degree, rather than a radical dualism (to borrow Mary Anne Warren’s 1987 phrase) between 
humans and everything else.15 
 Hellström’s point about morality as a matter of degree follows from Dodig-Crnkovic and 
Persson (2008) and Asaro (2006). Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and Daniel Persson (2008) argue that moral 
responsibility “can best be seen as a social regulatory mechanism” which can be distributed throughout a 
system of interacting entities (Dodig-Crnkovic & Persson 2008, p.2). Under this view, they see “moral 
responsibility not as individual duty, but as a role defined by externalist pragmatic norms of a group” 
(p.2). To illustrate their definition, Dodig-Crnkovic and Persson describe maintaining a nuclear power 
                                                 
15 Rowlands argues the same: that moral agents can only blamed to the extent that they understand why 
certain motivations and actions are right or wrong (p.240-241). 
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plant, where there “must be several levels of organizational and physical barriers in order to cope with 
different levels of severity of malfunctions” (p.3). When something malfunctions, blame is not put solely 
on one component of this system; it is distributed throughout multiple inter-working entities within. If 
intelligent systems can be included in socio-technological systems, some blame may be distributed to 
them. Peter Asaro (2006) argues that if a robot decides and acts based on institutional policies, then they 
can be praised or blamed when the institution as a whole is praised or blamed (p.14). This is how robots 
may be included into socio-technological systems. Both Asaro and Hellström illustrate distributive 
responsibility through militaristic and governmental organizational structures. Suppose that a soldier or 
bureaucrat follows orders from a superior and carries out a (morally) wrong. The blame for this wrong 
may be distributed between the soldier/bureaucrat and their superior. Similarly, Asaro and Hellström 
argue that robots ought to be considered as apart of a socio-technological system: therefore, they can be 
distributed some responsibility. 
Since Asaro’s, Hellström’s, and Dodig-Crnkovic and Persson’s arguments for distributive 
responsibility focuses entirely on how robots act within a system, they may be considered mechanism-
based accounts of moral responsibility. Asaro, Hellström, and Dodig-Crnkovic and Persson rely on 
analogies and illustrations in their arguments; they don’t give explicit criteria for which entities within a 
socio-technological systems would qualify for distributed moral responsibility. It seems as though they 
imply that any entity within a socio-technological system could be distributed moral responsibility. 
However, they also do not give explicit criteria as to who/what may be included in a socio-technological 
system. A person using a knife might be considered a socio-technological system, wherein the person 
(representing the ‘socio-’ part) uses a knife (representing the ‘-technological’ part). Yet, if a person cuts 
someone with a knife, the knife is obviously not morally responsible. This is contradictory. Their notions 
of distributive responsibility and socio-technological systems are ambiguous. In section 4, I will devote 
some time to clarifying the former. For now, we can give Asaro, Hellström, and Dodig-Crnkovic and 
Persson the benefit of the doubt and assume that they imply that Hellström’s criteria of autonomy and 
autonomous power are thresholds to being distributed moral responsibility. 
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Floridi (2013) argues that “there are clear and uncontroversial cases in which an artificial agent 
may qualify as a moral agent” (p.135). Similar to an account of distributive responsibility, he argues that 
this “does not relieve the creator of that agent of responsibility” (p.135). In order to be an artificial agent 
(not necessarily morally, but close to it,) a machine must be: 
1) interactive, i.e. “the agent and its environment (can) act upon each other;” 
2) autonomous, i.e. “the agent is able to change its state without direct response to interaction: it can 
perform internal transitions to change its state;” and 
3) adaptable, i.e. “the agent’s interactions (can) change the transition rules by which it changes state” 
(p.140-141). 
To illustrate, Floridi gives the example of Menace, a 1960’s machine that learned to play tic-tac-
toe using probabilistic methods to measure the success of certain wins based on past moves and their 
corresponding outcomes. Viewed on the level of a sequence of games, Menace is interactive since it 
responds to and acts upon the state of the game. It is also autonomous, since it follows transition rules, i.e. 
rules that dictate how it plays the game, without being directly reprogrammed by someone else. Finally, it 
is adaptable, since its transition rules change based on the success of past moves. Therefore, Floridi 
argues Menace is an agent, because it can learn and change its rules of play between games (p.144-145). 
Floridi’s understanding of an agent seems very close to that of a moral agent. It seems that if Menace 
were performing morally consequential actions, then Floridi might consider it a moral agent, at some 
level of abstraction. 
Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen (2009) also adopt autonomy as a criterion for moral agency. 
However, they also consider sensitivity to values necessary (p.26). Sensitivity is a matter of degree. For 
example, Bruno Latour’s (1999) speed bump at a crosswalk has the embodied value of slow down “so as 
not to endanger students:” it is sensitive to values, but to a low degree (p.186). Wallach and Allen call 
these sort of embodied values operational morality. An agent that is highly autonomous and highly 
sensitive to values (like humans) has moral agency. The moral capacities that autonomous machines have 
lies between operational morality and full moral agency, which Wallach and Allen call functional 
morality (p.26).  
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What constitutes being highly sensitive to values is fairly ambiguous. I think it can be interpreted 
in two ways (which correspond to weak and strong criteria for moral agency later). First, one can be 
sensitive to values without being motivated by an internal state (consisting of desires, beliefs, or other 
intentional states). Asaro, Dodig-Crnkovic and Persson, and Hellström would think that an artificial agent 
may be sensitive to values in that they are programmed to mechanistically follow good rules. In this 
sense, an agent need not be driven by normative obligations which can be disobeyed. An agent may 
blindly follow rules that a good person would consistently endorse in order to be sensitive to values in a 
weak sense. This is possible if a robot (with no internal state) is designed to explicitly follow good rules. 
In another, stronger sense, sensitivity to values may require being motivated by an internal state. 
Following Johnson’s criteria (1) and (3) from Section 1, this means that an agent must be motivated to 
follow to the best or most right action. This requires a significantly higher level of autonomy and 
discernment for which action is best in a certain context. This requires an intentional, internal state to 
motivate one’s actions based on moral reasons. 
Johnson argues that computer systems do not have internal states necessary for moral action. 
Johnson writes that 
the traditional account specifies that one of the mental states must be an intending to act. While 
most of the attention on this issue has focused on the requirement that the internal states be mental 
states, the intending to act is critically important because the intending to act arises from the agent’s 
freedom (p.199). 
Even if we could say that the complex computations that produce a machine’s actions are mental 
states, Johnson argues that these mental states are mechanically determined: any computer that has the 
same programming with all the same inputs will produce the same mental state. Because their mental 
states are determined, machines’ mental states cannot be intending to act. Thus, Johnson argues that 
machines cannot be moral agents. They “produce effects in the world, powerful effects on moral patients” 
(p.200). Hence, Johnson argues that they are moral entities; yet, they cannot be morally responsible. 
Furthermore, “those who argue for the moral agency (or potential moral agency) of computers… go 
wrong in viewing computer systems as independent, autonomous moral agents” (p.195). 
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Amanda Sharkey (2017) argues that machines are always “human-tethered,” in that their actions 
cannot escape the influence of the designers and social surroundings that create them (p.212). Sharkey 
goes so far as to argue that we ought not to design machines that reach a threshold requirement for moral 
agency for fear that designers would “offload blame for mistakes or bad consequences onto robots” 
(p.210). Both Johnson and Sharkey argue that robots ought to be considered moral entities in that they 
make decisions that are morally consequential. Sharkey argues that robots cannot be moral agents because 
1) Robots lack a biological basis for morality; 
2) Robots’ actions cannot be separated from the motives of their designers; and 
3) Robots are not embodied: neither their body nor any others’ has value to them (p.210-212). 
Criterion (2) is an argument against autonomy. Thus, (2) is equivalent to Johnson’s argument that 
robots lack autonomy. Criterion (3) has to do with sociality: robots cannot be social because they do not 
have a conception of any other person’s body, nor the pain or suffering that they inflict on another’s body. 
Thus, Sharkey would argue that autonomy and sociality, as well as an internalized, biological basis for 
morality are all necessary conditions for moral agency. 
To summarize, those who argue for moral agency in current or potential machines argue that (1) 
autonomy and (2) a weak notion of sensitivity to values (that does not require being motivated by internal 
states) are necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. Call this the weak criteria for 
robot moral agency. Generally, they argue for distributive responsibility of machines actions in a socio-
technological system. I define autonomy as the ability for an agent to interact with and adapt their actions 
in response to the environment, where their actions are not entirely determined by a designer. This 
definition combines Hellström’s notions of autonomy and autonomous power, Floridi’s notions of 
autonomy, interactivity, and adaptability, as well as Johnson and Sharkey’s notions of independence. A 
weak definition of sensitivity to values requires that an agent explicitly follow rules to act in a way that a 
good person would endorse. In a socio-technological system, proponents of moral agency in robots argue 
that, in a socio-technological system a machine acts motivated by the moral motivations of the moral 
principles they are encoded with, similar to a soldier acting on commands given from a superior. In a 
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socio-technological system such as this, a robot may be distributed some responsibility for their actions, 
like a soldier being blamed for following immoral orders from a superior. 
Those who argue against moral agency in machines generally argue that (1) autonomy, (2) a 
strong sense of sensitivity to values (which requires internal states), and (3) sociality. These are the strong 
criteria for robot moral agency. The definition for autonomy is the same as above. Internal states are 
mental states that are intending to act. Internal states are impossible if a being’s mental states are 
determined. Thus, if a robot does not act autonomously, they cannot have internal states. A robot may be 
sensitive to values in a stronger sense if they can have intentional mental states that motivate one to act 
for moral reasons. For machines, sociality is tied to embodiment. Robots are not social because they are 
not embodied and do not value their own or another’s body. In general, I define sociality as an ability to 
empathize with and be concerned with the well-being of other moral patients and moral agents. 
 
Section Four: Animals and Robots 
I now compare arguments between machine and animal ethics for and against moral agency. It is 
intuitive to think of animals and machines in the same breath. Descartes does it. They are both liminal 
beings, caught between inanimate objects and humans. In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 
Heidegger (1982) places animals between rocks and humans in an ontological hierarchy. Likely, he would 
do the same with sufficiently autonomous machines.16 Furthermore, when considering whether or not to 
extend personhood, morality, or moral agency to just one of these liminal beings, we often consider the 
other. In “Can Intelligence Be Artificial?” Fred Dretske (1993) makes frequently appeals to animal 
intelligence as he argues against treating artificial intelligence as legitimate intelligence. In “When Is a 
Robot a Moral Agent?” John Sullins (2006) uses an extended analogy of a guide dog to consider moral 
responsibility in robots. Shapiro (2006) considers a gang of macaques that act empathetically in a 
controlled experiment; he writes that if the macaques had “been acting robotically… certainly we would 
                                                 
16 This may be a contentious point. 
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have no cause to find their behavior admirable” (p.361, emphasis mine). Sharkey (2017) briefly considers 
the biological underpinnings of morality --drawing on Bekoff and Pierce (2009) and primatologist Frans 
de Waal-- in order to argue that machines do not have such social, emotional, or bodily capabilities. She 
makes clear that these biological foundations are not sufficient, but only necessary conditions for moral 
agency. 
All of the above consider animals and machines only briefly. Their comments are restricted to a 
single paragraph or a single line. They consider these cross-comparisons only as tools for argumentation: 
e.g. Sharkey considers animals only to show that robots do not have the biological foundations of 
morality that certain animals might; Shapiro considers robot behaviors only as a thought experiment for 
how animals might behave mechanistically. I would like to make these connections more apparent, more 
central in moral considers of animals and robots. Given how intuitive these cross-comparisons are, 
thinkers ought to argue for criteria for moral responsibility that apply both to animals and machines. 
Animal ethicists ought to be reading and communicating with robot ethicists; and vice versa. 
One of the only pieces of scholarship that does this is the article “Considerations about the 
relationship between animal and machine ethics,” wherein Oliver Bendel (2016) considers moral 
scenarios that arise between animals, machines, and humans. Though Bendel’s article sounds similar to 
the kind of cross-field analysis that I propose, it is not. Bendel considers “the relationship between animal 
and machine ethics” by way of actual interactions between machines and animals, e.g. mechanized 
slaughterhouses or animal-safe roadways (p.103). I propose something more like the analogies of Sullins 
and Sharkey, but more extensive and not metaphorical: a comparative analysis between scholarship on 
morality and moral agency in animals and robots. It’s clear that humans are moral agents. It’s clear that 
rocks are not. But, for liminal beings such as animals and machines, it is much more pressing that the 
reasons for and against attributing personhood, morality, and moral agency be consistent between these 
fields.  
In order to maintain this consistency, I will apply the criteria for moral agency given in robot 
ethics to moral animals. I will argue that, under robot ethics criteria (both the criteria from proponent and 
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opponents to moral agency in machines,) moral animals ought to be considered moral agents. This 
requires translating the robot ethics criteria into definitions that can be applied to animals, then arguing 
that moral animals meet these criteria. 
First, consider the criterion of autonomy. As stated in the previous section, many arguments for 
and against moral agency in robots emphasize autonomy as a primary threshold. I defined autonomy as 
the ability for an agent to interact with and adapt their actions in response to the environment, where their 
actions are not entirely determined by a designer. The last stipulation about a designer arises in response 
to arguments from Sharkey and Johnson that robots are not moral agents because their actions are so 
influenced by their design process that they cannot be considered independent entities. I would like to 
extend my definition of autonomy to animals. However, it is clear that this last stipulation does not apply: 
animals are not created by humans. So, it seems as though the criterion of autonomy (under the given 
definition) would too easily be achieved by animals. In order to extend this definition to animals, we must 
consider what undermines autonomy in their situation. 
Autonomy --even in machines literature (see Hellström 2013)-- can also be defined as an 
understanding or independence from one’s environment. Floridi (2013) notes that autonomy “imbues an 
agent with some degree of complexity and independence from its environment and from those who build 
the agent” (p.140). In robot ethics, it’s the latter criteria that really matters: autonomy is determined by a 
degree of complexity and independence from those who build an artificial agent. In animal ethics, it’s the 
former: autonomy is determined by a degree of complexity and independence from an animal’s genetics 
and environment. This is the classical Cartesian critique of animals (and machines): that their actions are 
simply mechanistic responses to inputs from their environment. Scientific descriptions of animals often 
undermine the autonomy of their subjects by describing their behaviors as mechanistic responses that 
solely rely on genetically-based instinct. 
This can be illustrated best by certain cases of animal constructions and environmental 
engineering. In Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge, Ashley Shew (2017) writes that 
“beavers always construct their dams at the narrowest part of streams, which requires fewer materials and 
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less effort than building at wider stretches would” (p.92). This appears to indicate that beavers can 
conceive of their environment so as to be able. This seems to indicate that beavers conceive of themself 
and their actions independent of their environment enough to be able to to understand that a particular 
feature of it --namely, the width of the stream-- corresponds to the amount of work needed to build their 
dam. However, “observational and behavioral studies of beavers suggest that dams are built where they 
are because of noise volume, not because of ingenuity” (p.92). Beavers get irritated by the noise volume 
of the river, which is loudest at the narrowest part of the river; they build dams to cover up the sound 
(p.91-92). Dam-building is an involuntary response to the environment. The same is true of spiders, 
whose web-building behaviors are determined genetically. Spiders consistently build the same web design 
from when they are young to when they die: they cannot change the way they build. These animals build 
and adapt their environments. Yet, they do not do so autonomously. The difficulty for animal researchers 
to overcome when asserting that animals are agents (not necessarily moral agents) is to show that animals 
react with a level of ingenuity and not just as an involuntary environmental response. This is how animals 
can act autonomously. 
 Paul Shapiro argues that ants do not have moral agency because they act deterministically. Even 
though ants may behave in ways that seem outwardly moral or beneficial, their actions cannot be moral 
because they act deterministically. He likens ants to robots that behave based on simple algorithms 
informed by moral principles. In Wallach and Allen’s terms, these ants have operational morality; yet, 
they do not have functional morality (and certainly not full moral agency.) Shapiro reasons that moral 
animals, unlike these ants, act in non-deterministic ways. They act autonomously. 
By contrast, Shew gives a number of examples of animals that exhibit intentional technological 
knowledge when using tools and building constructions. Corvids (crows, jays, magpies, and ravens) can 
fashion twigs into complex hooks and pandanus leaves into blades for a variety of different uses (p.68-
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69).17 Dolphins place sponges on their noses and dig through the seafloor to find hidden fish (p.54). 
Capuchin monkeys break off flakes of stone to use as a blade (p.41). Chimpanzees fashion tools from 
sticks and twigs to catch ants and other food (p.39-41). Orangutans in the Milwaukee County Zoo even 
play with iPads! (Boyle, 3 Jan 2012). Though these are not necessarily moral actions, animal 
constructions and tool use show a capacity for certain animals to consider themselves and their actions 
distinct from their environment so much so that they can understand, manipulate, and interact with their 
environment in intentional, creative ways. Certainly, the actions of these animals would not be considered 
mechanically-determined responses to data received from their environment. These animals have the 
capacity to act autonomously. 
Next, I consider sensitivity to values. In Section 3, I discussed this criterion in greater depth. 
There, I argued for two varietals of Wallach and Allen’s definition: one with and one without internal 
states. Under the weaker form (without internal states,) a machine may be sensitive to values if they are 
programmed to explicitly follow rules which result in actions which a good person would endorse. Under 
the stronger form, a machine may be sensitive to values if they are internally motivated to follow moral 
reasons. To generalize to animals, we simply replace ‘machine’ with ‘animals’ in these definitions. 
To see that moral animals fulfill both of these criteria, consider Church’s (1959) and Rice and 
Priscilla’s (1962) experiments on rats discussed in Section 2. In these experiments, rats were shown to 
forgo their own food in order to save another rat from being shocked or starved. They acted altruistically 
because they felt empathy (albeit a very simple form) for another rat when it was harmed. First, those who 
did not pull the lever did not simply follow their genetically-programmed desires to pull the lever and eat 
the food. They followed a moral emotion and chose to act for the sake of another. They acted 
autonomously. Second, consider that, instead of this experiment being carried out on rats, it were carried 
out on humans: Theo is given a lever that lets out food, but shocks Emma, if Theo pulls it. A good person 
                                                 
17 Shew notes this example is especially pertinent because it shows that birds, which are usually 
considered lower creatures, have the capacity for intentional planning and three-dimensional spatial 
awareness. 
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would endorse Theo if he did not pull the lever. Most of the rats did not pull the lever (for similar reasons 
that Theo would not). Thus, a good person would endorse the rats’ actions. The rats acted on a (weak) 
sensitivity to values. 
At this point, I have shown that these rats acted autonomously and sensitive to values (in a weak 
sense). Thus, they fulfill the weak criteria for robot moral agency. Based on criteria from Asaro, Dodig-
Crnkovic and Persson, Hellström, Floridi, and (in some sense) Wallach and Allen, these rats ought to be 
considered moral agents. They are morally responsible for their actions. If one of Church’s rats pulls the 
lever and shocks another, they ought to be blamed (and possibly punished).  
This is an absurd conclusion. The rats do not fully understand how good or bad their actions are, 
based on how much harm they inflict on the shocked rat. They have no capacity to reflectively endorse 
their actions or motivations. They cannot deliberately intervene to change their course of action for the 
better. Under the two criteria for moral agency in animals that I argued for in Section 2, namely second-
order volition and intervention control, these rats come nowhere near being morally responsible for their 
actions. Thus, the weak criteria for robot moral agency are faulty and ought to be abandoned in favor of 
the criteria of second-order volition and intervention control. 
An observant reader will note that the conclusion that Church’s rats are moral agents is not 
exactly implied by the weak criteria for robot moral agency. In actuality, these thinkers argue for moral 
agency in a system of distributed responsibility. Proponents of distributed responsibility reason that the 
threshold for moral agency ought to be lower than traditionally construed, because they consider 
machines in a larger socio-technological system in which responsibility must be distributed throughout 
many different actors. Thus, their definition ought to be considered not necessarily grounds for full moral 
agency, but grounds for the distribution of responsibility within a larger social system. When an animal 
acts autonomously and with sufficient sensitivity to values, it can be included in a socio-animal system in 
which responsibility is distributed. 
The problem with this view of distributed responsibility is that it is not entirely clear what kind of 
responsibility may be attributed to an animal acts independently of a larger socio-animal system. A rat 
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that pulls a lever to help a fellow rat in a controlled environment is not obviously a part of a larger system 
like a soldier taking orders from a superior might be. Animals’ actions are often independent of a socio-
animal system in which humans and animals interact and act together. However, we can simply say that 
an animal may act within socio-animal system that includes only themself. Thus, if an animal meets the 
threshold for autonomy and (weak) sensitivity to values, they may be considered moral agents in system 
where responsibility is distributed solely to them. The same absurd conclusions that Church’s rats are 
moral agents follows. 
 Next, I consider the stronger criteria for robot moral agency. The primary differences between the 
weaker criteria and the stronger criteria are the additions of internal states to the definition of sensitivity 
to values and the criterion of sociality. Now, a moral agent must act (1) autonomously, (2) motivated by 
internal states that follow moral reasons, and (3) out of concern for the interests of another, especially in 
an embodied sense. 
 These three criteria are already met by Church’s rats. As argued above, they acted autonomously. 
Their actions were motivated by empathy, which constitutes an intentional mental state motivated by 
moral reasons. Thus, Church’s rats are sensitive to values in a strong sense. Because they are acting 
empathetically, they are also acting out of concern for the pain of the shocked rat. This is a concern for 
the body of another rat derived from a biologically-founded emotion. Thus, the actions of Church’s rats 
indicate a level of sociality necessary to meet criterion (3). Rats may be considered moral agents under 
strong criteria for robot moral agency, as presented by those who argue against moral agency in robots, 
i.e. Johnson, Sharkey, and (marginally) Wallach and Allen.18 
 Again, this is an absurd conclusion. This is a more striking result than my argument against the 
weak criteria of robot moral agency, considering that these criteria are stronger and reflect the views of 
those who do not think that robots can be considered moral agents. These results represent a wholesale 
acceptance of the moral agency of animals as relatively unsophisticated as rats within the field of robot 
                                                 
18 I put Wallach and Allen in both camps of robot ethicists because I included their notion of sensitivity to 
values as interpreted in both definitions. of moral agency. 
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ethics (or at least within those who have written on moral agency in machines). What I endorse as good 
criteria for moral agency in animals, i.e. second-order volition and intervention control, does not even 
consider the much more intelligent and social great apes or dolphins to be moral agents; so, it seems that 
the criteria for moral agency in robot ethics are too weak and permit too many animals to be full moral 
agents. 
 I think one ought to reject those criteria for robot moral agency. Of course, I leave myself open to 
the possibility that I have not read every argument for moral agency in robot ethics (though I have 
attempted to make a valiant effort to demonstrate the key voices here). If there are thinkers that do not 
argue in the way that the robot ethicists I have characterized here do, then my argument may simply not 
extend to them. 
Regardless, I think that the criteria of second-order volition, in the sense that it allows an agent to 
understand why their motivations and actions are good or bad, and intervention control, which allows an 
agent to deliberately intervene and change their habitual actions for the better, are well argued-for and are 
based in strong support from well-developed moral theories around moral responsibility. Even if I cannot 
show that a thinker’s work falls into my characterization of the current state of the field of robot ethics 
and leads to an absurd permittance of rats as moral agents, I still think there are good reasons to prefer 
second-order volition and intervention control as thresholds for moral agency.  
Furthermore, I think these criteria for moral agency ought to be consistent across the fields of 
animal ethics and robot ethics. Animal ethicists mention machines in their arguments and robot ethicists 
mention animals in their arguments all the time. (See the beginning of Section 4 for a list of examples.) 
When they do so, they implicitly reason that animals and robots are similar beings for which it is fruitful 
to compare to one another. We can understand more about animals by thinking about robots. And vice 
versa. Ultimately, we can better understand humans and our moral nature by comparison with these 
liminal beings. 
 Rather than maintaining distinct fields of animal and robot ethics, which ask similar questions of 
their subjects and consider other subjects only as props for the sake of argument, we ought to explicitly 
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bring out the similarities and dissimilarities between animals and robots. There are ways in which robots 
are not like animals. For example, robots are built and animals (save pets and domesticated animals, in 
some sense) are not. This has some consequence for the moral status of robots; and for the moral status of 
animals. The only to understand what this consequence is is by directly comparing the two (as John 
Sullins does).  
However, there is no reason that animals and robots are so dissimilar that they deserve entirely 
distinct definitions of moral agency. Animals do not have the capacity second-order volition nor 
intervention control. Nor do robots. Thus, I do not think that either are moral agents. Most adult humans 
have both capacities; thus, they are moral agents. If future robots meet these thresholds, they might be 
considered moral agents. One definition applies to all three subjects --humans, animals, and robots. 
Animal and robot ethics ought to hold consistent definitions of moral agency. Or, at the very least, robot 
ethics ought not to have definitions of moral agency which are so faulty that they admit rats to be morally 
responsible for their actions.  
To illustrate my point further, it would only take a reading of Mark Rowlands’ definition of a 
minimal moral subject to recognize that Wallach and Allen’s notion of sensitivity to values, even 
motivated by an internal state, is too weak of a notion for moral responsibility: 
X is a moral subject if X possesses (1) a sensitivity to the good- or bad-making features of 
situations, where (2) this sensitivity can be normatively assessed, and (3) is grounded in the 
operations of a reliable mechanism (Rowlands 2012, p.230).  
Here, criteria (1) and (2) in Rowlands’ definition of a moral subject look remarkably similar to Wallach 
and Allen’s notion of sensitivity to values in their definition of moral agency. Obviously, Rowlands’ 
definition for a moral subject is much too weak to be considered as a good definition of moral agency. 
Wallach and Allen’s definition ought to be revised.19 
                                                 
19 I recognize that Wallach and Allen could not have foreseen this, since Moral Machines was published 
in 2009, while Rowlands published Can Animals Be Moral? in 2012. However, the notion of sensitivity to 
values in robot ethics does not seem to have been revised yet. 
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I anticipate an objection here. I am arguing that, in terms of moral agency, there ought to be a 
consistent definition that applies to both animals and robots alike. Yet, as moral patients, animals and 
robots are very dissimilar. Animals are sentient and they may suffer. This is why they may be moral 
patients. Robots may never be truly sentient and may never be designed to suffer (or even have emotions). 
However, at some point, we might imagine a highly intelligent, relatively social robot that it might feel 
intuitively wrong to destroy or harm.20 In this case, the definition for a moral patient in animals (or any 
living thing) seem as though they need to be different from the definition of a moral patient in machines. 
Even though animals and robots are dissimilar, and may always be dissimilar, in the case of 
sentience and whether they may be considered moral patients, I think that we can offer an expanded 
definition of a moral patient that encompasses both robots and animals. If it is true that we will feel an 
intuitive sense of wrong being done to a highly intelligent robot that lacks sentience or suffering, then this 
reveals that sentience and suffering alone are not adequate for understanding who or what may be a moral 
patient. To understand these intuitions of wrongdoing, our definition of a moral patient would need to be 
expanded to consider a high level of intelligence as grounds for a being to be on the receiving end of 
moral actions. This would apply not only to highly intelligent robots, but to animals as well. Imagine an 
animal that has no emotions and simply follows determined rules, but does so in a way that indicates an 
high level of intelligence (one might imagine a collectively-intelligent ant colony or even a network of 
trees and fungi). If a high level of intelligence were grounds for considering a robot to be a moral patient, 
then there is no reason why a similarly intelligent animal would not be a moral patient as well. In sum, 
definitions of moral status --be it that of a moral patient, subject, or agent-- hold across kinds of  beings. If 
traits in one beings indicate a need to change our definition, then this ought to apply to all other beings as 
well. 
 
 
                                                 
20 I do not believe this. It is simply a hypothetical. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present arguments for and against moral responsibility in animals 
and robots and condense them into a well-formed definition of moral agency. I began by touching on 
some of the most influential considerations of personhood and moral responsibility from Frankfurt and 
Fischer and Ravizza, as well as a concise synthesis of classical arguments by Deborah Johnson. I then 
argued, following Regan, that animals are moral patients because they are sentient. I outlined arguments 
for and against moral action and moral responsibility in animals. I prefer Mark Rowlands’ understanding 
of the moral lives of animals. Certain animals --largely social mammals and birds-- may be considered 
moral subjects in that they can act morally via moral emotions. However, they are still not moral agents. 
To be a moral agent, one needs the capacity to reflectively endorse or understand their own motivations 
and actions as good or bad and to deliberately intervene to alter one’s habitual actions. Because animals --
even moral animals,-- do not have second-order volition nor intervention control, they are not morally 
responsible for their actions. 
Following a discussion of animals, I presented a reading of the question of moral agency within 
robot ethics. I found the field largely separated between those who argue for and those who argue against 
moral agency in robots. I synthesized many of these thinkers’ arguments into the following criteria for 
robot moral agency: (1) autonomy, (2) sensitivity to values, and (3) sociality. (1) and (2) make up what I 
call the weak criteria for robot moral agency. Adding (3) makes up the strong criteria. I applied these 
definitions to moral animals, arguing for an absurd conclusion in both the weak and strong criteria for 
robot moral agency. I argued for a rejection of these criteria in favor of the definition of moral agency, 
which relies on reflective endorsement and intervention control. Because robots --even autonomous 
robots,-- have neither of these two capacities, they are not (currently) morally responsible for their 
actions.21  
                                                 
21 These characterizations of autonomous robots and moral animals as amoral agent may change in the 
future, if significant research into either area reveals a capacity for reflection or guidance control. 
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Finally, I argued that this kind of argumentation via explicit comparison between animal and 
robot ethics ought to be considered. These two fields ask similar questions about similar liminal beings. 
And even where animals are not similar, direct comparison reveals interesting dissimilarities. These kinds 
of cross-field comparisons will, in turn, reveal more about humans and our moral nature. 
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Chapter 3: Building and Moral Responsibility 
The discussion of moral responsibility in animals stemmed from a consideration of animality in 
Steven Vogel’s work, in Chapter One. Vogel’s central thesis of postnaturalist environmentalism is that 
building implies responsibility. I presented principles, by way of Heidegger and Marx, for demarcating 
between humans and animals. Drawing on Frankfurt, who argues that personhood and moral 
responsibility are tied at the hip, I used Heidegger’s and Marx’s meditations on animality to provide 
definitions. Based on these definitions, I argued that humans are solely morally responsible for what they 
build. In Chapter Two, I presented how these ideas fit into a larger study of the moral status of animals. I 
gave arguments as to why animals are not morally responsible for their actions and argued for consistency 
in the principles underlying moral agency in humans versus liminal beings, i.e. animals, robots (we might 
include children here as well). 
One will notice that there is a slight disconnect between these two chapters. The first chapter is 
about moral responsibility for building; the second is about moral responsibility for action. Building is a 
kind of action. Thus, one might be inclined to extend the results from Chapter Two on moral agency to 
building: animals are not morally responsible for their actions, thus they must not be morally responsible 
for what they build. This is true. However, it does not mean that the capacity to be morally responsible for 
one’s actions is equivalent to the capacity to be morally responsible for what one builds. 
A parent, in some sense, builds their child; however, they are not morally responsible for their 
child’s action once she is a rational adult. I do not think we would say that the actual builders, the 
construction workers, that built the City Center Mall in Columbus, OH are responsible for the failure of 
that mall. By contrast, parents are responsible for the actions of their young children. Engineers are 
responsible for the things they design. Oppenheimer --who led the team that built the atomic bomb-- is 
responsible (in part) the death and destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Dog owners are responsible if 
their dog bites. 
These examples of building are vast and seemingly dissimilar. Vogel’s understanding of building 
is no less nebulus: he includes dams, machines, toasters, skyscrapers, a hut in the Black Forest, the Dow 
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Jones Industrial Average, shopping malls, and the environment. In this chapter, I will clarify what 
building is in a way that encompasses all of these examples. I will also discuss how we are (and are not) 
morally responsible for what we build. 
I will begin by discussing how moral responsibility arises in engineering ethics and philosophy of 
technology. I will then give a definition of building informed by Vogel, Marx, and Heidegger. I will then 
discuss how humans can be responsible for autonomous beings they build, drawing on literature about 
pets and children. Finally, I will discuss problems of present and future autonomous machines, drawing 
on the field of ethics of algorithms. 
 
Section One: Vogel on building 
  Steven Vogel (2015) considers building a social, material practice. The paradigm case of building 
for Vogel is constructing a mall. This is social in that an entire construction crew needs to work together 
in order to lay down a foundation, put up a frame, the walls, the floors. the ceilings. As well, all the 
materials --the concrete, the steel, the glass,-- are all produced and shipped by others. Especially in our 
increasingly global economy, building involves a massively social network of workers, engineers, 
designers, planners, etc. I agree with this. In general, I quite favor Vogel’s definition. 
 However, I think Vogel's definition of building lacks in two ways: (1) it does not account for how 
one may be morally responsible for what they build; and (2), Vogel’s definition simply does not 
encompass all the things that Vogel himself uses as examples of building. There are things which Vogel 
says are forms of building that do not fit under his definition of building as material construction. 
First, Vogel’s central thesis is that building implies responsibility. This is an intuitive notion; not 
one to argue against. However, Vogel seems to make exceptions to this rule without adequately 
explaining why they are exceptions. For example, he argues that we are not directly morally responsible 
for the environmentally harmful actions we need to do on a daily basis, e.g. when Vogel drives to work in 
the morning because he cannot walk, bike, or take the bus. Vogel argues that, since we have no control 
over how our roads and cities are structured and we do not understand their structure in terms of 
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environmental actions, we cannot be morally responsible for, say, driving to work in the morning. 
However, we are responsible in that we have the capacity to collectively organize and democratically 
restructure our society (here, he means our society’s material structure) in order to encourage more 
environmentally-friendly individual actions. In Chapter One, I argued the same point from the standpoint 
of Marx’s understanding of animality and alienation. I extended Vogel’s argument to imply that those 
who are closer to positions of power in determining the structure of a society or economy are most 
responsible for how we build the environment. This is a very different, much more complicated thesis 
than simply that ‘building implies moral responsibility’. A consequence of this, which I argue that Vogel 
would condone, is that there are certain persons (e.g. marginalized or disenfranchised persons) would not 
be morally responsible for their individual environmental actions if they do not have any say in how their 
society is organized. This is a case where someone builds the environment through their individual 
actions, yet they are not morally responsible. This is an exception to the rule that building implies moral 
responsibility. Vogel’s definition of building does not make immediately evident why this is an 
exception. 
Consider another example of an exception to the thesis that building implies moral responsibility 
that cannot be fully explained by Vogel’s definition of building. Workers built the highway system. They 
built the streets that the buses run down. They even built the buses. Vogel drives to work in the morning 
because the neighborhood he lives in is too far from his place of work to walk, bike, or take the bus. His 
car emits greenhouse gases. He would emit far less if he walked, biked, or took public transit. In this case, 
Vogel is not to blame for the architecture of his city and its lack of sustainable means of transportation. 
Nor are the workers who laid the concrete that made the highway or forged the parts that made the bus. 
They did so as a social practice. They created the material conditions of the city, namely the highways 
and the streets and the bus. The workers built the city (following Vogel’s definition of building to a T). 
However, they should not be held morally responsible for the environmentally-poor design that forces 
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Vogel (and everyone else) to emit more greenhouse gases on his drive to work.22 It is not those who 
engage in the material practice of building that are responsible for what they build. 
Those who planned the city, those who designed its overall structure, should be morally 
responsible. The city planners and politicians and car company executives and lobbyists are really the 
ones who built the city. They did not do so materially: they were not driving the bulldozers and backhoes, 
laying the pavement. They did so immaterially. They laid the ideal foundations for those workers 
(mentioned above) to follow their plans and build the material structure of the city. 
The distinction between material and immaterial forms of building arises out of Marx. In the 
Grundrisse, Marx [1858] adopts the classical political economists’ (Adam Smith and the like) categories 
of productive and unproductive labor. Productive labor “is only that which produces capital,” i.e. a 
material thing which has value ([1858], p.302).23 In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) 
critiques Marx’s notions of productive and unproductive labor via Marx’s example of the piano maker 
and the piano player. Marx rhetorically questions whether both the piano maker and the piano player are 
productive workers, since “the piano would be absurd without the piano player” ([1858], p.302). Marx 
answers himself, ‘no’: the pianist may “produce music and satisfy our musical ear,” and even “to a certain 
extent produce the latter [our musical ear];” yet, making music is not “productive labour in the economic 
sense” (p.302).24 When the pianist makes music, Marx writes, it is no more productive than “the labour of 
the madman who produces delusions” (p.302). Marx acknowledges a de facto distinction between the 
                                                 
22 I may accept that they can be responsible in an implicit sense. In an article published in Science & 
Engineering Ethics, Eric Katz (2010) describes how designers of crematoria ovens --though they were not 
told of their uses-- engineered the ovens with questionable characteristics, e.g. to permit “high capacity 
and more efficient burns in the ovens” (p.575). Though they acted under the orders of higher-up SS 
officials, these engineers may be complicit in the death of millions in concentration camps, because they 
should have had a clue into what they were designing. Similarly, if a bridge construction crew should have 
reason to be suspicious of the bridge they build, they may be complicit and somewhat morally responsible 
for it. 
23 This distinction between activities that produce capital and those that do not reminds me of Aristotle’s 
notion of poiesis, which I will discuss shortly. 
24 In a very interesting analysis that is, sadly, totally unrelated to my current argument, Chakrabarty notes 
that this is “the closest that Marx would ever come to showing a Heideggerian intuition about human 
beings and their relation to tools. He acknowledges that our musical ear is satisfied by the music that the 
pianist produces. He even goes a step further in saying that the pianist’s music actually --and ‘to a certain 
extent’-- ‘produces’ that ear as well” (p.68). 
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labor of the piano maker who literally constructs the material piano versus that of the pianist and the 
madman who ideates. Then, “Marx both acknowledges and in the same breath casts aside as irrelevant the 
activity that produces music” (Chakrabarty 2000, p.69).  
Chakrabarty critiques Marx’s dismissal of the pianist’s labor, since it constitutes a dismissal of an 
important history of labor (p.69). In “Immaterial Labor” Maurizio Lazzarato (1996) introduced the term 
immaterial labor in part to recognize activities of the artist or the influencer of public opinion, which have 
been dismissed as “work” (p.132).  
The primary reason that Lazzarato introduces immaterial labor, however, is to define the 
“informational content of the commodity,” i.e. changes (circa 1996) in the workplace wherein “skills 
involved in direct labor [became] increasingly skills involving cybernetics and computer control” (p.132). 
To give a formal definition, immaterial labor is “labor that produces an immaterial product, such as ideas, 
images, forms of communication, affects, or social relationships” (Hardt 2005, p.176). “It is not primarily 
about making a material object, like the work that makes a car roll off an assembly line or extracts coal 
from a mine;” to this, Vogel would add work that builds a mall (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter 2009, p.4). 
In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) describe immaterial labor as “the hegemonic 
form of labor” in today’s day and age. They do not mean that immaterial labor is dominant in that the 
most number of workers produce immaterially; but, rather that capital depends on computers or creative 
design to lead and plan out most of the work that is being done today. Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de 
Peuter (2009) identify the videogames industry as a site of an enormous wealth of immaterial labor. For 
Dyer-Witheford (2015), recognizing immaterial labor as a form of labor is a way of drawing connections 
between the newly-emerging digital managerial class, e.g. IT workers, engineers, architects, and the 
material labor of the classical proletariat class, e.g. those in the Global South who mine for cobalt or work 
in a factory assembling electronics. Immaterial labor is a theoretically and practically important and well-
established notion that is distinct from the notion of material labor. Both forms of work rely on one 
another. But, for the sake of this chapter, I draw on this distinction between immaterial and material labor 
for the same reasons that Dyer-Witheford (2015) does: to recognize the work of engineers, designers, and 
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architects in the unique ways that they build. The immaterial work of planning and design is emerging as 
the most morally consequential form of building today. 
 Vogel’s definition of building is as a material act. He does not recognize immaterial labor as a 
form of building. He claims that building implies responsibility; yet, those who build materially are rarely 
responsible for what they build. More often, it is the planners, the architects, the designers, the engineers 
that are responsible for how a thing is built. Because Vogel considers building to be strictly a material 
practice, he precludes considering how one may be morally responsible for their immaterial labor in the 
building process. 
 Second, Vogel’s philosophy of building suffers from an internal inconsistency in that his 
definition of building does not encompass all of the things that he lists as examples of building. For 
examples of things that we build, Vogel lists dams (p.23), tools (p.84), machines (p.151), toasters, 
skyscrapers, a hut in the Black Forest (p.169), the Dow Jones Industrial Average (p.78), and, most 
importantly, shopping malls (p.131) and the environment (p.30). These are all (save the possibility of the 
environment, which I will explain shortly) constructed. 
Usually we think of building as construction. We build a house or a bridge or a mall. To build 
colloquially means to construct an edifice. Marx recognizes production as the fashioning of natural 
materials into human means --construction (see the 1844 Manuscripts (1975) and Capital [1867], Volume 
One, Part 3, Chapter VII, Sections 1 and 2). Vogel also considers building as construction: as social 
construction (Vogel 2015). Vogel takes the notion of social construction literally. Usually when we 
invoke social construction, it is to reveal something as contingent upon our history and social 
organization, and therefore mutable (p.36). For example, if we argue that the notion of race is socially 
constructed, it is to say that the idea of race was created in a genealogy of social contexts. If the categories 
of race lead to racial discrimination (as in the United States,) then this idea ought to be changed. 
Revealing race as a social construction is recognition of the idea of race as contingent upon our societal 
and cultural structure, which can be changed intentionally by its members. Vogel does not mean social 
construction in this sense. Rather, Vogel argues that, as a society, we literally construct our environment. 
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Vogel understands building as social, material construction. 
In addition to the mall, toasters, and the environment, Vogel also lists ecological restorations 
(p.111), babies, and purebred dogs (p.151) as built things. These are not constructed. To show why, I will 
focus on the example of ecological restoration.25 Restoring something is not the same as physically 
constructing it. The builder of a forest does not place trees into the ground and nail leaves onto the 
branches. The process of building a forest relies on caring for and implicitly shaping the trees and plants 
as they grow, like shaping a bonsai tree. 
In his defense, Vogel’s definition of building as material construction grounds some very 
important conclusions in his philosophy (which I agree with).26 For one, Vogel argues that every single 
action that we do, in some way, transforms and constructs the larger material structure of our environment 
(p.56). This allows us to understand our individual actions in how they contribute to the larger collective 
formation of the environment. This aligns with the environmental virtue of “self-knowledge” (p.117). For 
another, material things are hard to change. We often construct things poorly (p.119) and the things that 
we build escape our intentions once we bring them into the material world. Thus, our practices ought to 
be “marked by a spirit of tentativeness and fallibilism, not by hubris” (p.166). We ought not think of 
ourselves as masters of the world who can construct the environment exactly as we want to (p.167). This 
aligns with the environmental virtue of “humility” (p.119). In combination, Vogel writes that 
self-knowledge and humility might be the key environmental virtues, teaching us of our 
responsibility for the world we inhabit on the one hand but also reminding us not to overestimate our 
ability to remake it in any way we want on the other (p.121). 
These environmental virtues are a direct consequence of Vogel’s understanding of building as 
material construction. Yet, I do not think this restricted understanding of building is the only way to argue 
for the importance of these virtues. This is the aim of this chapter: to show how and why we are 
responsible for what we build. This is a form of self-knowledge. It also allows us to understand how we 
                                                 
25 Though I agree with Vogel in that babies may be built, in a sense that I will discuss later, I recognize 
that this may strike many as odd examples. Eric Katz (1992) also discusses bred dogs and ecological 
restorations as living artifacts. 
26 I think his definition of building as social is fine. I see problems with building as material construction. 
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build poorly --and thus how we ought to be humble-- when we build in immaterial ways or ways that are 
not encapsulated under the name ‘construction’. I think that we can give a definition of building that 
consistently describes the numerous examples of building that Vogel describes and demonstrates how we 
may be responsible for what we build. 
 
Section Two: Building as Cultivation 
In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger (1971) makes a distinction between construction 
and cultivation. He writes: “Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things 
and the building that erects buildings” (p.146). The primary case of construction is raising an edifice 
(p.145). The building that cultivates growing things is what restoring a forest, raising a domesticated 
animal, or caring for a baby is like. 
Even in Heidegger’s work, the paradigm case of building is construction: building a bridge 
(p.145). He writes that cultivation, i.e. “[b]uilding in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making 
anything” (p.145). I read this as saying that cultivation allows something to grow and make itself; one 
does not directly construct it. Heidegger uses the example of when a farmer tills her soil or cultivates her 
grape vines (p.145). 
Cultivation is extremely important for Heidegger. As discussed in my Chapter One, Vogel and 
Heidegger disagree about the materiality of building. Heidegger considers the hand (which builds) 
primarily as a hand that writes. For Heidegger, building is rooted in thinking. For Vogel, thinking is 
rooted in building. Heidegger considers writing a form of building. Particularly, he considers writing 
cultivation. Byung-Chul Han (2017) notes that, for Heidegger, writing is “a matter of cultivating, 
plowing, and tilling language like the soil” (p.38). This is an interesting, important point in Heidegger that 
I must but briefly gloss over for the sake of my argument. 
What is important for my argument is that Heidegger considers writing, an immaterial act, a form 
of building. In particular, it is a form of cultivation. Thus, cultivation can be material or immaterial. 
Construction is strictly material. Writing is closer to the work of the engineer or the designer than it is to 
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the work of the construction worker. The civil engineer who designs a bridge does not physically build 
the bridge. She relies on the construction workers to do so for her as she shapes the project. This is 
remarkably similar in form to the shaping of a bonsai tree or an ecologically-restored forest. The civil 
engineer allows the bridge to grow on the backs of the construction workers. Thus, I argue that the 
planning that engineers, architects, or designers do is a form of cultivation. 
Considering cultivation as a form of building allows us to consider ecological restorations, dogs, 
and babies as built things. It also allows us to consider how engineers, designers, and other planners build 
in immaterial ways and how they may be responsible for what they build. 
It also allows us to understand how we build the environment. In many ways, we do not directly 
construct the environment. We let off pollutants like DDT or greenhouse gases that stifle the growth of 
many of the lifeforms that make up our environment. Our responsibility, then, is to care for the 
environment by cultivating an environment which can grow into a beautiful, amiable, good form. 
Cultivation is associated with the environmental virtues of care and humility (which Vogel would approve 
of). Considering the environment as built through cultivation allows us to understand the ways in which 
we currently do not care, and the ways in which we ought to care, about the environment. 
Next, I will introduce a definition of building that encompasses both construction and cultivation. 
I will then consider why and when we are morally responsible for what we build. 
 
Section Three: What is building? 
 Building brings something into being. For example, when a carpenter builds a house, they bring 
the house into being. This definition is simple. This makes it wider than the common understanding of 
building, which largely aligns with Vogel’s definition of building as construction. Colloquially, building 
has the connotation of constructing a non-living thing out of non-living materials. For example, we would 
say that a carpenter builds a house, but a gardener grows a garden. If the gardener plants and cares for the 
plants, she is bringing it into being as much as the carpenter does a house. Thus, under my definition 
(which includes cultivation,) a gardener builds a garden. 
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This definition looks strikingly similar to Aristotle’s notion of poiesis: to bring something into 
being that did not exist before. Cultivation brings something into being; though, it is not prima facie clear 
that it brings something into being which did not exist before. In fact, Heidegger does not think it does: he 
writes that cultivation i.e. “[b]uilding in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making anything” 
(1971, p.145). When a gardener cultivates a garden, they are not bringing the plants themselves into 
being. The gardener is not making something, like the carpenter who constructs a house. 
However, I think that the gardener still brings a garden into being in the sense that she cultivates 
the plants and gives them a form. Suppose that a patch of plants grows naturally, growing into a ragged, 
scattered patch of plants. The gardener weeds and trims in order to bring out the form that of a well-kempt 
garden out of this patch of plants. Through cultivation, the gardener forms how the plants grow and how 
they are formed. In this sense, I think that the gardener brings a garden into being. Thus, cultivation 
brings something into being in that it presents a growing thing in a certain form. In this sense, I think 
cultivation is like poiesis. 
However, poiesis connotes an abstract creative process, separate from practice. I do not wish to 
make this separation for building. Construction brings something into being as a material practice. 
Cultivation may also bring a material thing into being. However, cultivation can also be an abstract 
creative process, like engineering, design, or architecture. These activities are closely related to techne as 
well, since building is a technological activity. In all, I do not mean to limit building to a specific kind of 
bringing something into being, e.g. strictly material or immaterial, or strictly poiesis. My definition 
should open to a wide variety of forms of building, which encompasses many of the examples Vogel lists. 
However, my definition should be understood semi-informally: building ought to be understood in light 
of its common sense, technological connotations. 
The aim of this chapter is to understand how and why, fundamentally, we are morally responsible 
for the things we build. With a definition of building established, the next section is dedicated to 
understanding building as an action that we may be morally responsible for. 
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Section Four: Building and moral responsibility 
Building is an action. Like any action, building has a direct effect. A carpenter builds a house (the 
action) and a house is built (the effect). Yet, building is different from regular actions in that a 
consequence of the act of building may be an action later enacted through or by a built thing. For 
example, when a roofer hammers a shingle into a roof, there is the direct action that drives a nail into the 
roof through the shingle. However, there is also a later effect wherein water flows over the top of shingle. 
Building not only causes the direct effect of a thing being built, but it also causes future (indirect) effects 
enacted through or by the built thing. The rainwater runs off the roof; this is an effect enacted through the 
characteristics of the shingles (the built thing). A house creaks; this is an effect enacted by the house (the 
built thing). This latter form of indirect causation is characteristic of building. Building causes deferred 
effects, which depend on the built thing. 
Deferred effects that building causes are interesting when considering moral responsibility. How 
one can be morally responsible for the direct effects of an action is an old and saturated problem 
stretching back at least to Aristotle. Very few (if any) have discussed why we are responsible for what we 
build. For example, suppose that Gerry intentionally pours a bucket of water into Mary’s attic. This is a 
direct action that causes Mary’s attic to flood. Gerry should be blamed for any grief it causes her. On the 
other hand, suppose that Gerry intentionally builds a faulty roof that lets rainwater into Mary’s attic. This 
is a deferred effect. Gerry should also be blamed for her grief. In the former situation, Gerry let water into 
the attic. In the latter situation, Gerry built the roof. The roof let water into the attic. The latter action is 
not direct. If responsibility were assigned like any other direct action, the roof would be responsible for 
letting water into Mary’s attic. Intuitively, however, we know that Gerry is responsible for the leakage. It 
is only through the faulty roof that this effect is enacted. The study of moral responsibility involving 
normal, direct actions does not immediately apply when considering deferred effects from building. This 
is what I focus on in this chapter: why is a builder morally responsible for the deferred effects of the thing 
they build? In other words, why are we morally responsible for what we build? For example, why is 
Gerry morally responsible for letting water into Mary’s attic? 
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Furthermore, building may not be viewed as a string of direct actions and effects that cause each 
other. If Joe knocks down a domino that hits another domino and another and so on, Joe is responsible for 
knocking down not only the first domino but every domino after it. By contrast, when Gerry builds a roof, 
it is not a direct consequence that water will leak. It would not leak if it simply did not rain. The rain, in 
some sense, causes the leakage via the faulty roof. This effect (the leakage) is indirectly caused by the 
faulty roof, and thus by Gerry. When Gerry builds a faulty roof, there is a stored potential that the roof 
will let water into the attic. Because of this, one cannot simply say that Gerry is responsible for letting 
water into Mary’s attic like Joe is responsible for knocking down the last domino in a line.27 
In fact, I do not think that the kind of responsibility that I am proposing --responsibility for the 
deferred effects of a built thing-- can be described by any other major framework of moral responsibility. 
While they are very similar, theories of individual (mentioned at length in Chapter 2), collective (see 
Feinberg and Arendt), and distributed responsibility (see Asaro (2006), Dodig-Crnkovic & Persson 
(2008), Hellström (2013), and Floridi (2013)) cannot entirely encompass why and how we are morally 
responsible for what we build. Individual moral responsibility looks like 
Agent → Patient, 
collective responsibility looks like 
Collective → Patient, 
distributed responsibility looks like 
Collective → Individual in collective system → Patient, 
and responsibility through building looks like 
Agent (Builder) → Built Thing → Patient. 
All of these four schematics look different and are unique in some way. They have similarities, but cannot 
be encompassed entirely by one another. Thus, building implies a unique form of moral responsibility that 
needs its own theory to be properly understood. I rely on similarities between these other forms of moral 
                                                 
27
 Here I use ‘responsible’ rather loosely. The same point about Joe’s dominoes and causal responsibility may 
easily be made about moral responsibility. 
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responsibility and draw insights from them to illustrate how and why we are morally responsible for what 
we build. 
 Though not directly addressed in a unified theory, much of philosophy of technology is dedicated 
to understanding how engineers and designers are responsible for what they build. From Don Ihde's 
notions of embodiment relations and multistability to Bruno Latour's notion of script, philosophy of 
technology illuminates how a technology communicates these embedded values from the point of view of 
the user of these technologies. Postphenomenology understands how technologies determine how we 
experience (with) the world. As a value-neutral example, looking through a pair of glasses, the wearer 
“experiences a transformed world” (Rosenberger 2017, p.70). There are less neutral examples. Peter-Paul 
Verbeek illustrates how a sonogram transforms one's world in an “ethically non-innocent manner” 
(Rosenberger 2017, p.71). The fetus, in actuality, is small and engrossed by fluid and flesh with the 
womb. Yet, the sonogram zooms in on the image of the baby, making it seem larger and more separated 
from its mother's womb –which now presents itself only as an environment to house the fetus. The 
sonogram shapes how one sees a baby in a womb; this influences mothers to treat their fetus as an 
independent child when considering medical intervention, e.g. having an abortion or a C-section. In this 
sense, the designers of the sonogram embed certain values into the technology. Their design choices 
influence how a mother makes moral decisions based on how they see their baby through the sonogram. 
In general, designers embed values into the things they build by shaping the way that the technology 
shapes our experience of the world. 
Wallach and Allen (2009) write that “[o]ne of the major accomplishments in the field of 
‘engineering ethics’ over the past twenty-five years has been the raising of engineers’ awareness of the 
way their own values influence the design process and their sensitivity to the values of others during it” 
(p.25). A famous example of gender bias in engineering is that seatbelts are far more dangerous to women 
because cars are often designed with only a crash test dummy the size and build of an average male 
(Shaver 25 March 2012). Because they created these faulty seatbelts, these engineers might be considered 
responsible for the harm that was caused by it (I will consider when we may and may not ascribe blame to 
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these engineers later). 
 This is also true of engineering in an algorithmic age. Algorithmic technologies automate human 
actions. This makes them unique in that many algorithmic technologies do not need a human actor to 
make decisions or act. In this sense, algorithmic technologies may be autonomous. Yet, we still consider 
software engineers responsible for their algorithm's decisions. Often in computer science and engineering, 
algorithms are presented as mathematical constructs (see Hill 2016), which are “apolitical, technocratic, 
and value-free” (Danaher 2015, p.5). The field of ethics of algorithms approaches algorithms from the 
perspective of how they are understood by the general public (Mittelstadt et al. 2016, p.2). The public 
understands algorithms as embedded in a specific technology, often one which makes socially-
consequential decisions, e.g. search for information or assign a credit score (see Kraemer et al. 2010; 
Danaher 2015; Mittelstadt et al. 2016). Designers create these algorithms with embedded values so that, 
when they make socially-consequential decisions, they acquire an ethical dimension (Kraemer et al. 2010; 
Danaher 2015; Mittelstadt 2016). Often, this leads to algorithms that perpetuate discriminatory decisions 
based on gender, race, class, etc. (for popular discussions of algorithmic bias, see O'Neill 2016; Noble 
2018; or the Algorithmic Justice League). For example, early optical character recognition (OCR) 
algorithms could not recognize black faces or search algorithms associate the word 'man' with 'doctor' and 
'woman' with 'nurse'. Software engineers embed values into the algorithmic technologies they make in 
that these technologies make socially-consequential decisions with an ethical dimension. Often, this plays 
out in the form of perpetuating sociodemographic biases.28  
In an article on engineering and responsibility written for The Ethics of Technology, Jessica 
Nihlén Fahlquist (2017) makes a couple distinctions important for understanding how engineers are 
responsible for what they build. Nihlén Fahlquist distinguishes between backward-looking and forward-
                                                 
28 There are other values embedded in algorithms. Many algorithms are embedded with values to 
disregard a reasonable expectation of user privacy (Nissenbaum 2010). As well, social media algorithms 
prefer content that is more sympathetic to a user's political leanings and rarely exposes users to content 
that will challenge their worldview, leading to undemocratic degeneration of the ability to dialogue across 
difference (Sunstein, 2006; Pariser, 2011; Bozdag, 2013). 
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looking responsibility (p.133). Backward-looking responsibility is what I have been referring to (and will 
refer to) generally as moral responsibility or blameworthiness. It is the capacity to look back on an action 
or event and blame someone for it in a way that is fair. Forward-looking responsibility, on the other hand, 
has an “efficacy aim” to prevent an action or event in the future (p.133). Ascribing forward-looking 
responsibility to someone is to hold them responsible, not necessarily to uphold standards of fairness and 
morality, but simply for preventing an action or event in the future. We often ascribe backward-looking 
and forward-looking responsibility to the same person, they are not the same. However, there are 
instances where we would say one is responsible in a forward-looking sense, but not in a backward-
looking sense. 
This is often true for engineers and designers. Forward-looking responsibility is particularly 
important for engineers who deal with “technological risks” (p.133). For example, a mother was hit and 
killed crossing the street on Maryland Avenue on the East Side of St. Paul, MN in 2016 (Gottfried May 
24 2016). It was a grave accident; if anybody, the driver is to blame. Yet, the task of preventing future 
pedestrian deaths on the street was charged to the civil engineers at the city. They restricted the number of 
lanes from two to one at crosswalks and put in large cement medians intermittently in the middle of the 
street to slow drivers down. The driver who hit the mother might be ascribed backward-looking blame. 
The civil engineers were not: they were ascribed forward-looking responsibility because they have the 
power and means to change the road in order to prevent future deaths. Engineers and designers, in 
general, have the capacity to change our material world to promote or prevent future outcomes. They are 
often ascribed forward-looking responsibility only. 
However, in many of the other examples listed above, e.g. Gerry’s roof that leaks rainwater into 
Mary’s attic, seatbelts that disproportionately harm pregnant woman, or OCR algorithms that do not 
recognize black faces, it seems reasonable to blame the designers or builders. The project of assigning 
moral responsibility to a builder for the thing they build must be wary of this double meaning of 
responsibility --as forward- or backward-looking-- and be able to decipher when a builder is blameworthy 
and when they are only responsible in a forward-looking sense. 
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Section Five: When are we not responsible for what we build? 
 As discussed earlier, civil engineering and architecture may be understood as forms of 
cultivation, since the designer writes and plans the form of a built thing and the construction crew 
constructs the built thing into this form --similar to a gardener planning the form of the garden and relying 
on the plants to grow into this form. If all the plants in the garden grow, the flowers bloom, and the 
garden still looks ugly, then this is the gardener’s fault. The plants did as they were supposed to, growing 
into the form that the gardener supplied. The gardener planned an ugly garden. Similarly, we would not 
blame the construction crew for the collapse of the Florida International University (FIU) footbridge if 
they properly followed the civil engineers’ plans.29 Even though they built the material thing, those in the 
construction crew are not morally responsible for the collapse since they simply followed orders.30 The 
engineers (more likely, the project managers) are morally responsible because they created faulty plans 
for the material builders to follow. This is the first case where someone is not morally responsible for 
what they build: if one builds by simply following instructions set by someone else. Most often, this 
occurs when a material builder is following the instructions of an immaterial builders, i.e. a designer or 
engineer. 
There are situations where one cannot be blamed for their actions. Involuntary actions are not 
blameworthy. For Aristotle, “things [actions] coming about by force or because of ignorance are 
involuntary” (Aristotle 2000, p.30). Regarding forces, this is restricted to physical forces. For example, if 
a man is walking and “a wind or people who have [him] in their control were to carry him off,” his 
movements would be involuntary (p.30). Regarding ignorance, Aristotle allows that “action done in 
ignorance” may be voluntary, like actions done while drunk (p.32, emphasis mine). These actions are still 
voluntary if one chose to get drunk. Only action done by ignorance, i.e. lapse of knowledge, renders an 
action involuntary. Furthermore, Aristotle writes that this is not “ignorance of the universal;” rather, one 
                                                 
29 http://abcnews.go.com/US/pedestrian-bridge-florida-international-university-
collapses/story?id=53774444 
30 I am not sure if this was actually the case. I am only speculating and hypothesizing about if this were 
the case. 
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must be ignorant “of the particulars which the consists in” (p.32).31 For example, Aristotle writes that if 
you stab someone with a foil that you thought had a dull point at the end, this action is involuntary 
because you did not know it was sharp. 
 As another example, Aristotle writes that if you accidentally discharge a cannon when you 
intended to simply demonstrate how it works, this action is involuntary. If the cannonball hit and killed 
someone, Aristotle would say the person who accidentally discharged the cannon was not blameworthy 
for their actions because the discharge was involuntary out of ignorance. Aristotle seems too lenient 
towards accidents. Accidents may be actions done out of ignorance or they may be done unintentionally 
(often times, they are both). Regarding intentions, many would say that actions done intentionally may be 
blameworthy. If they are unintentional, there may still be cases where one may be culpable for their 
actions. Michael Bratman (1987) considers two types of actions where the outcomes may be expected: 
ones where the outcome is expected and intention (such as a terrorist bombing a school) or ones where the 
outcome is expected, but unintentional (such as a government bombing a group of enemies so near a 
school that they know that the school will be destroyed, but it is not their target) (p.139). I think both 
types of actions are blameworthy. Thus, all actions done unintentionally where the outcome is expected 
may be blameworthy (all other things permitting culpability).  
Regarding ignorance, I think there is a reasonable expectation that the soldier that discharges a 
cannon be more careful around the cannon so as not to discharge it. Even if he discharges it on accident, 
this seems like a form of negligence. Gideon Rosen (2002) writes that: “[w]hen a person acts from 
ignorance, he is culpable for his action only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts” (p.61). 
Rosen gives an example of where he is culpable for his ignorance:  
I am under an obligation to look out for other people when I’m out walking. If I recklessly shirk 
that obligation and wind up ignorant as a result, the ignorance itself is culpable, and in that case it’s 
no excuse (p.63). 
                                                 
31 Ignorance of the universal means something like not knowing what the good is and acting on that. For 
example, if you (incorrectly) thought stealing was good and stole, this would be ignorance of the 
universal. 
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The reckless walker fails to act with an appropriate amount of care for other people; when he does not 
notice other people and runs into them, he acts out of negligence. He should be blamed for his actions. 
Joseph Raz (2010) calls this obligation to exercise an appropriate amount of care a “duty not to harm 
through carelessness,” which is a duty not to violate a “duty of care” towards others (p.9). By violating 
these duties and acting carelessly, i.e. acting negligently, one may be culpable for their actions. Thus, in 
order to be culpable for one’s ignorance, they must be ignorance due to negligence. In general, one may 
be blamed for actions done out of ignorance if and only if this ignorance is negligent. 
 Negligence is especially pertinent when considering building. It seems that the designers of the 
seatbelt built out of ignorance, since they did not think of pregnant women when they designer the 
seatbelt. However, they ought to have thought of this specific, sensitive audience to design for. Same with 
the designers of optical character recognition software that could not recognize black faces. Even though 
acted out of ignorance, the designers of these products did so negligently and their actions are still 
blameworthy. Presumably, the seatbelts were made as such because there were no (or at least very few) 
women on the design staff; there were few black faces in the datasets that optical character recognition 
algorithms train on and relatively few black people in software design in general. This is why achieving 
adequate representation of gender, race, class, languages, religion, etc. among engineers and designers is 
important: in order to limit the amount of negligent harm targeted at specific socio-economic groups of 
people via built products. A builder is blameworthy for what they build unless they are non-negligently 
ignorant of the consequences of the thing they build. 
 Let us return to the FIU footbridge. At the time of writing, the only public statement about the 
bridge was that it collapsed due to cracks in the support beams (Fagenson 16 March 2018). I will present 
two hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the difference between negligent and non-negligent ignorance in 
building. First, suppose that the civil engineers who designed the bridge did not know the average number 
of people that walked over the bridge on a daily basis. They underestimated the weight that the bridge 
holds and cracks developed. Eventually, the cracks caused the bridge to collapse. In this case, it is 
reasonable to assume that knowing the average amount of daily traffic is necessary for designing a proper 
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bridge. Lack of such knowledge is a form of negligence. The engineers were ignorant of the average 
weight that the bridge ought to hold. However, their ignorance arose out of negligence. Thus, they are still 
morally responsible for the deaths and injuries caused by the collapse. 
 Second, suppose that the engineers did all they could to research the proper information about the 
bridge: they conducted studies to find the expected average and maximum amount of people who crossed 
the bridge, the weather conditions, etc. However, a pack of squirrels decided to take refuge under the 
bridge. They burrowed into support beams and caused the cracks. The cracks compromised the structural 
integrity of the bridge and it collapsed. In this case, there is no way that the engineers could have 
expected this problem. Thus, they built the bridge by non-negligent ignorance of the way that the squirrels 
would cause the bridge collapse. In general, a builder is not morally responsible for what they build if 
they do so by non-negligent ignorance of particular consequences. Ignorance of particulars is non-
negligent when the particulars cannot be reasonably expected. 
 
Section Six: Moral Responsibility for Built Agents 
 In an article published in Ethics and Information Technology, Andreas Matthias (2004) makes a 
similar point about exceptions to ascribing responsibility to those who engineer machines and algorithms. 
Matthias agrees that those who build machines ought to be responsible for the actions that machines do or 
the actions that operators of machines –assuming that the operator follows the manufacturer’s instructions 
correctly (p.2-3). Matthias also agrees with me that the designer of a machine ought not to be held 
responsible for any “unforeseeable development” (p.2). Matthias argue that control is necessary for 
responsibility. Thus, when an engineer is “not capable of predicting… future machine behaviour,” the 
engineer, not in control of these behaviors, is not responsible (p.2). 
 Citing Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Matthias writes that someone is in control of their action 
“only if he knows the particular facts surrounding his action, and if he is able to freely form a decision to 
act, and to select one of a suitable set of available alternative actions based on these facts” (p.2). There are 
two problems with this view. First, this is a misreading of Fischer and Ravizza (1998), who do not see 
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alternative actions as necessary for the kind of control necessary for moral responsibility, i.e. guidance 
control. What Matthias describes here is regulative control, which Fischer and Ravizza argue is not 
necessary for moral responsibility. (See Section 1 of Chapter 2 for a longer discussion of Fischer and 
Ravizza). Second, Matthias falls into the same trap as Aristotle, wherein he describes the lack of 
information –ignorance-- without considering ignorance that arises from negligence. Thus, Matthias' point 
about excusing software engineers for unpredictable consequences aligns with my general claims that we 
are not responsible for what we build, as long as Matthias' notion of control is understood as guidance 
control and ignorance as non-negligent.  
 As I noted when introducing algorithmic ethics, algorithmic technologies are unique in that they 
can make decisions without a human operator. In Chapter Two, I defined an actor as autonomous if they 
can interact with and adapt their actions in response to the environment, where their actions are not 
entirely determined by a designer. Traditional algorithmic technologies are not autonomous, since their 
algorithms are explicitly-programmed instructions that guide their decisions. However, a new kind of 
algorithms, machine learning algorithms, have allowed for the development for autonomous artificial 
agents. 
 Whereas traditional algorithms behave based on rules defined by software engineers, machine 
learning algorithms define their own rules by “generalizing from examples” (Domingos 2012, p.1). This 
entails “learning” patterns and generalizations within large datasets in order to identify a proper decision 
procedure (p.1). In a forthcoming work, Diane Michelfelder and Logan Stapleton use the example of a 
postal service algorithm that reads handwritten postage and translates the handwriting to computer 
characters. It would be impossible to do this using a traditional algorithm: the amount of variety and 
complexity in our handwriting is too difficult to put into explicit rules. Instead, we use learning 
algorithms which can simulate an artificial learning process and eventually define its own rules for 
deciding which handwritten character is which.  
The learning algorithm is given a large dataset that contains, say, 10,000 pixelated snapshots of 
handwritten letters and numbers (for example, one of NIST’s Special Databases). Each of these snapshots 
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may be labeled with the correct character or left unlabeled. If the snapshots are labeled, the learning 
algorithm parses through the dataset and finds patterns between all similarly-labeled snapshots, e.g. all the 
pixelated snapshots that correspond to the letter ‘G’. If the snapshots are unlabeled, the learning algorithm 
parses through the dataset, picking out similarities between certain groups of pixels and grouping 
snapshots together based on these similarities. For example, a learning algorithm might put the letter ‘I’ 
and the number ‘1’ in the same group, since many people write these two characters very similarly. In 
general, a learning algorithm takes in a large dataset and parses through it to pick out patterns and define 
its own decision procedures. 
Two things become apparent about learning algorithms, following this explanation. First, 
technologies that use machine learning are capable of being autonomous. Luciano Floridi (2013) notes 
that the level of autonomy of an artificial agent seems to be proportional to the level of opacity of the 
algorithmic system that the agent runs on. An algorithm is opaque if a user cannot understand how the 
algorithm decides. The more opaque an algorithmic system, the less we understand its actions, and the 
more autonomous the artificial agent seems to be. Frank Pasquale (2015) details a number of ways an 
algorithm may be opaque: due to corporate secrecy, technical illiteracy, etc. In all of these forms of 
opacity for traditional algorithms, there is a way to demand transparency and be able to understand 
explicitly how an algorithm makes decisions. 
 Machine learning algorithms, however, are used precisely in situations where traditional 
algorithms cannot, because engineers cannot “provide an explicit, fine-detailed specification of how 
[complex tasks] should be executed” (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014 p.viii). Because an explicit 
specification of a task cannot be supplied, explicit explanations for the behavior of machine learning 
algorithms also cannot be supplied. Users cannot exactly know “the rationale of decision making rules 
produced by the algorithm” (Mittelstadt et al. 2016, p.3). Jenna Burrell (2016) argues that this leads to a 
new form of opacity where a learning algorithm automatically defines its own way to make decisions in a 
way that cannot be directly explained not only by a user, but even by its own designer. No outside 
observer can say exactly why an algorithm decides in a certain way or another; they can only give implicit 
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explanations based on the programming of the learning algorithm and its past behaviors. Technologies 
that run on learning algorithms can respond to their environment, in that they take in contextual data and 
change their decision procedures according to it. Yet, they can act independently of their environment and 
their designer: their designer cannot even directly explain why their algorithm acts the way it does. Under 
my definition of autonomy, learning algorithms allow for a technology to act autonomously.  
 Second, training a machine learning algorithm is not like constructing a basic machine or an 
explicitly-programmed algorithm. Though it is not apparently material form of building, creating software 
based on traditional algorithms is more like construction than it is like cultivation: nothing grows when 
you program a technology. For example, if you build a robot A that is programmed explicitly to tweet 
once every hour on the hour, you have built essentially the same thing as a cuckoo clock. Cuckoo clocks 
are constructed; as are robots programmed explicitly to behave like a cuckoo clock, like robot A does. 
Suppose, for contrast, that you build a robot B that takes in a large dataset of pictures of the sun at 
various points throughout the day, labeled with their corresponding times, and learns to identify the time 
simply from looking at the sun in the sky. You can use robot B for the same purpose as robot A or the 
cuckoo clock; robot B will be able to tweet once every hour on the hour, by looking at the sun. Robot B is 
built in a different way than robot A. I think the ways that these two robots are built are different in kind. 
Robot A is constructed. The designer of robot B may give the robot a form by steering it towards a 
behavior of being able to identify the time given images of the sun. Yet, the designer of robot B did not 
explicitly construct a way to get there. The designer of robot B lets the algorithm loose in a large dataset 
to train itself the proper decision procedures. Training a machine learning algorithm is more like baking 
bread than it is like tossing a salad. The salad is constructed, since one simply puts a given number of 
ingredients in a bowl together and nothing grows. The bread is formed on the backs of the rising yeast. 
The baker does not make the bread in that the bread really comes into existence while the yeast eats the 
flour. Yet, the baker can be said to make the bread in that she gives a form to the yeast to grow into. 
Similarly, the learning algorithm is formed on the backs of the patterns in the dataset. Building a machine 
learning algorithm is a form of cultivation. Matthias goes so far as to call technologies built on learning 
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algorithms “software organisms” (p.15).  
Most of modern robotics is based on machine learning. Thus, modern robotics ought to be 
thought of as a form of cultivation. We build a robot not by constructing it into the exact structure that we 
intend to. We build a robot by coaxing it into a form that we intend. In this sense, a robot can be said to 
grow. And a engineer can be said to raise a robot. The engineer cultivates an autonomous agent. This is 
like child-rearing.  Child-rearing is a form of building, of shaping a living person into the form that they 
will become, of cultivating a person. 
As such, the parent as a builder may be morally responsible for the thing that they build, i.e. the 
child. Intuitively, this is how we understood blameworthiness for children. 
There are instances where one is not blameworthy for the actions of their child, however. Clearly, 
the parent is not responsible for the actions of their child once their child becomes a fully rational adult. 
As a rational adult (say, an adult capable of guidance control and second-order volition,) the child is a 
moral agent. Thus, the child may be blamed for their actions. No longer can the parent be blamed for their 
child’s actions. The blameworthiness of a parent diminishes once their child becomes a moral agent. 
This is true of robotics as well. Deborah G. Johnson (2006) writes that “attributing independent 
moral agency to computers is dangerous because it disconnects computer behavior from human behavior” 
(p.204). She argues that attributing moral agency to computer systems redirects the ethical attention away 
from humans and onto computers (p.204). Amanda Sharkey (2017) argues that we ought not build 
artificial moral agents because this would “offload blame for mistakes or bad consequences onto robots” 
(p.210). Many robot ethicists argue against creating more sophisticated robots in the future for the fear 
that the human designers’ responsibility will be diminished once an artificial agent may be considered a 
moral agent. At the point where we may build moral agents, the moral responsibility for what we build is 
diminished like a parent whose child grows into a moral agent. Thus, it seems that there are no pressing 
worries about diminishing responsibility of robotics engineers until the far-off possibility that robots 
become moral agents. Many robot ethicists argue that we ought to prevent the creation of such robots (see 
the work of Noel Sharkey and the ‘Campaign for Killer Robots’). 
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I disagree with this. A designer’s responsibility for the artificial agents they build lies long before 
the creation of moral agents. For example, the (1978) movie Halloween opens on a scene where the six-
year-old Michael Myers (who goes on to be the silent serial killer in the movie) horrifically kills his sister 
with a kitchen knife. An atrocity is committed by a child. Who is to blame? 
Michael Myers is not a full moral agent. It is reasonable to say that Michael does not understand 
his own actions. Thus, he cannot be blamed. His parents have raised him. Under the usual formulation of 
moral responsibility for a child’s actions, Michael’s parents seem to be blameworthy for Michael’s 
actions. Yet, intuitively this seems false. Michael’s parents had no way of knowing or any way of 
predicting that Michael would do something like this. This was an unforeseeable development (in 
Matthias’ words) in the actions of the agent that they are cultivating. Thus, for the same reasons that the 
civil engineers were not responsible for the collapse of the Florida footbridge in my hypothetical scenario 
where squirrels caused cracks, i.e. because the engineers built out of non-negligent ignorance, we cannot 
blame Michael’s parents for the actions of their child. Since neither Michael nor his parents are 
blameworthy, no one is to blame for the death of Michael’s sister. Someone may be responsible for 
Michael Myers in a forward-looking sense only. In the movie, Michael is sent to an asylum to be 
rehabilitated or confined in order to prevent future deaths. (Spoiler: he escapes and starts terrorizing a 
town on Halloween night.) However, no one is blameworthy. 
This is a case where those who build (Michael’s parents) an agent (Michael) are entirely 
diminished of the moral responsibility for their agent. Yet, this is not a case like those outlined above, 
where responsibility is diminished because the agent becomes a full moral agent. Michael is not a moral 
agent. Yet, Michael’s parents responsibility is still entirely diminished. We can imagine similar events for 
the builders of autonomous artificial agents. The artificial agent may not be considered a moral agent; 
thus, we cannot blame it. However, there may be situations where the builder may not be blameworthy as 
well. If a builder builds an artificial agent under non-negligent ignorance of unforeseen future behaviors 
of this agent, then the builder may not be responsible. Since the artificial agent is not a moral agent, it 
may not be morally responsible as well. Thus, there are situations where no one can be blamed, even 
  
80 
 
though the built agent is not a full moral agent.  
Matthias (2004) argues for the same results. He argues that learning algorithms will lead to the 
development of machines whose actions lie outside of the control of their builders (p.3). He gives an 
example where NASA loses most of their ability to communicate with a semi-autonomous Mars rover; 
the rover, driving based on its own autonomous algorithmic control system, drives into a hole (p.3). In 
this case, the engineers were “not capable of predicting… future machine behaviour” (p.2). Thus, the 
engineer is not responsible. In fact, no one is to blame (p.3). Matthias (2004) calls this the responsibility 
gap (p.4). 
The responsibility gap that Matthias and myself are arguing for is particularly striking. The 
problem with focusing on the day that artificial agents may be considered full moral agents or the kind of 
robot apocalypse that popular culture fixates on (see the 1984 movie, The Terminator, or Elon Musk’s 
recent comments about AI) is that it diverts attention away from the ethical problems that arise with 
technologies that are possible today or in the near future.32 It is a tragedy that Michael Myers can kill his 
sister and no one is to blame. But, it is harrowing to imagine a scenario where someone may be killed by 
a machine --designed and built by someone-- and no one is to blame. 
 Aside from their arguments about diminishing responsibility, both Johnson and Sharkey argue 
against attributing moral agency to robots because blaming human designers leads to forward-looking 
responsibility. Johnson argues that when we focus moral attention solely on the humans that make 
computer systems, “the design of computer systems is more likely to come into the sights of moral 
scrutiny, and, most importantly, better designs are likely to be created” (p.204). 
 However, I think blaming the designers of autonomous artificial agents is not the only way to 
effect forward-looking moral responsibility. Imagine a robot that is a full moral agent, able to control and 
understand the moral weight of their actions, that kills a human being. This scenario is scary. But, their 
programming can be changed and they may learn to act better. At the very least, we may blame the robot. 
                                                 
32
 www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/elon-musk-warns-ai-could-create-immortal-dictator-in-documentary.html 
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Now imagine a robot that is not a moral agent that kills someone. For example, we might consider a 
scenario like the recent fatal accident that killed the driver of an autonomous Tesla (Tesla Team 27 March 
2018). It is unclear whether the Tesla designers acted out of non-negligent ignorance of a scenario like 
this. However, if we assume that they did, then the designers could would be morally responsible for the 
driver’s death. A human being’s life ends. It is difficult to see why this accident happened. And no one is 
to blame. This second scenario seems scarier to me than the first. Considering the Tesla example, it is also 
clear that scenarios like this are already here and will increase in the future. These scenarios are bad 
enough to inspire forward-looking responsibility for robot engineers in order to avoid it. Thus, even 
though blame may not be placed on a designer, we may place forward-looking responsibility on the 
designers of such machines in order to prevent horrible scenarios where no one is to blame. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I defined building as action which brings something into being. This can be 
understood as construction, which makes something out of things that do not grow, or cultivation, which 
cares for and gives form to something that grows. Based on this definition, I presented a theory of why we 
are morally responsible for what we build. This kind of moral responsibility, I argue, is different in kind 
than individual, collective, or distributed responsibility. As well, there are scenarios where we are not 
responsible because of the same reasons that an actor is not blameworthy for involuntary actions. A 
builder is not responsible for a consequence or action of the thing they build if the builder cannot 
reasonably foresee this consequence or action. In this case, the builder builds out of non-negligent 
ignorance and is not blameworthy. With our most advanced technological capabilities, such as 
sophisticated learning algorithms, I argued that engineers are capable of building autonomous artificial 
agents (which are not yet moral agents). In general, engineers are responsible for the actions of the agent 
they build. I argued that there are certain cases where a builder builds an agent that commits an otherwise 
morally reprehensible act for which no one is to blame, since the artificial agent is not a full moral agent 
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and the builder builds the artificial agent out of non-negligent ignorance. 
 These cases are scary. They are imminent. As Matthias (2004) points out, these scenarios pose a 
“threat to both the consistency of the moral framework of society and the foundation of the liability 
concept in law” (p.4). More importantly, their possibility means that there will be scenarios where 
atrocities are committed by artificial agents and no one is to blame. We can imagine this happening today 
with the advent of sophisticated driverless cars. Thus, in order to prevent such scenarios of blameless 
atrocities, I think that engineers ought to adopt similar virtues that Vogel proposes as environmental 
virtues: self-knowledge and humility. Engineers ought to know themselves and their designs so as to 
understand where atrocious accidents may occur. This is to prevent negligence. However, they also ought 
to understand that horrible accidents do happen and it is better to be safe than sorry. Thus they ought to be 
humble and not design technologies so quickly that they lose the ability to predict certain horrific 
accidents. 
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